NATO-EU cooperation almost came to a halt after 2004. This article scrutinizes the evolution of NATO-EU cooperation and argues that the major problem with regard to this cooperation goes beyond the vetoes by Turkey and Cyprus. Rather, there is a deeper and historically embedded dynamic at play: the traditional divide between Europeanists and Transatlanticists and how this leads to a decoupling in NATO. An understanding on the part of the Europeanist Allies that they also have commitments towards NATO is needed.

Münevver Cebeci*
The answer to the question “What blocks NATO-EU cooperation?” is actually more complex than the simple conclusion that Turkey and Cyprus are blocking the process. The major reason behind the current stalemate is the tendency of some EU Member NATO Allies, led by France, to increase the autonomy of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). If the same EU Member States showed a similar interest in enhancing NATO’s role in the world, the problems with regard to NATO-EU cooperation would, most probably, be solved easily. Nevertheless, there is an increasing decoupling of NATO as some of its EU Allies tend to pursue their European politicking in the Alliance and further the Union’s interests. This article attempts to develop this argument through analyzing the evolution of NATO-EU cooperation, looking into the problems caused by Turkish and Greek Cypriot vetoes, and analyzing how decoupling within NATO affects its relations with the EU.

The Evolution of NATO-EU Cooperation

There were no direct relations between the EU and NATO until the creation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Rather, the Western European Union (WEU) had acted as a conveyor between the two institutions as the defense component of the EU and NATO’s European pillar. The major development that changed the course of events in European security was the Franco-British St. Malo Summit of December 1998, which paved the way for the creation of an autonomous European defense capability. This decision was significant in the sense that it referred to a shift in British foreign policy as the Blair government removed Britain’s traditional objection to the creation of such autonomous European capabilities which could rival NATO. The decisions made at the Summit were welcomed by both the U.S. and NATO. The U.S. reacted with Madeleine Albright’s famous 3 Ds, asserting that the EU should avoid duplication, decoupling, and discrimination. On the other hand, NATO, in its Washington Summit decisions of April 1999, drew attention to some specific points: The Allies declared that the Union should only launch autonomous operations where NATO “as a whole is not engaged” –i.e., NATO should remain as the first resort– and that any relationship between the

---

1 In terms of their inclination in Transatlantic relations and their approach to European security, there are two major groups of member states in the EU: Europeanists and Transatlanticists. Europeanists, led by France, are those countries which doubt U.S. military engagement in Europe and seek European autonomy in developing security and defence capabilities. Transatlanticists, led by Britain, emphasize NATO’s primacy in European security, and are against the development of an autonomous European defence capability at the expense of the Alliance, claiming that this would lead to rivalry between the two organizations. There are also some EU Member States which do not belong to any one of these two poles but which rather mediate between them (e.g., Sweden and Finland). Germany used to take on a mediating stance before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but since then, it has increasingly become Europeanist. Denmark, on the other hand, is the keenest Transatlanticist which has an opt-out from the CSDP.

EU and NATO and between the EU and non-EU European Allies should build on the existing arrangements under the WEU framework.³

Upon the welcoming stance of the U.S. and NATO, the EU, in its declaration attached to the Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council (3-4 June 1999), tasked the General Affairs Council to prepare the conditions and the measures necessary to achieve the objective of creating a European defense capability, also providing the definition of the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which would be necessary for the EU to fulfill its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks.⁴ The declaration openly stipulated the demise of WEU as an organization by the end of the year 2000,⁵ upon the completion of the necessary arrangements.

The decisions taken at the Cologne European Council marked the creation of the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) and the removal of all non-MBT statuses and tasks of WEU, including Associate Member, Observer and Associate Partner statuses. This meant that non-EU European Allies (Turkey, Iceland, and Norway, then) would lose their Associate Partnership in WEU and the rights that they had due to this status. Nonetheless, the Cologne European Council declared that the EU would put in place arrangements that would allow non-EU European Allies and partners to take part in the EU’s crisis management activities “to the fullest possible extent.”⁶ It also acknowledged that the EU Member States’ different status “with regard to collective defense guarantees [would] not be affected” and the Alliance remained the “foundation of the collective defense” of its members. Despite these statements, the Cologne European Council decisions were rather vague in determining the CESDP’s link with NATO and the status of non-EU European Allies. They were especially criticized for not mentioning NATO as the first resort in the conduct of crisis management operations.


⁵ The Modified Brussels Treaty (MBT) was kept until it was terminated in March 2010.

Six months later, the Helsinki European Council adopted a clearer language regarding NATO’s role in European security, recognizing it as a first resort. It declared that the EU Member States were determined “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, to launch and conduct EU-led” military crisis management operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged. Furthermore, it was made clear that this process would “avoid unnecessary duplication” of NATO assets and capabilities and would “not imply the creation of a European army.” The European Council also set the Helsinki Headline Goal, stating that the “Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.” This marked the creation of a European task force for crisis management; namely, the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).

The Helsinki European Council also provided for the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies but these statements were left rather vague. It fell short of setting the modalities regarding the latter’s involvement in the CESDP in line with the decisions taken at NATO’s Washington Summit. It only stated that measures would be taken for necessary dialogue, consultation, and cooperation with NATO, its non-EU members, and EU candidate countries, with full respect to the EU’s decision-making autonomy and single institutional framework. Within this context, the non-EU European Allies would be able to participate, if they so wished, in an EU operation that would make use of NATO assets and capabilities, whereas, they had to be invited by the Council in case of an EU-only operation. The non-EU European Allies would have the same rights with EU Member States with regard to the day-to-day conduct of any EU operation to which they committed troops.

The Feira European Council was significant for its emphasis on civilian crisis management capabilities of the CESDP and it also pronounced the term European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) together with CESDP for the first time. The Nice European Council was mainly important for its identification of the structure, competence, and the tasks of the Political and Security Committee (PSC/COPS), the Military Committee (EUMC), and the Military Staff (EUMS). With regard to the non-EU European Allies’ involvement in the ESDP, the Nice European Council envisaged some consultation possibilities and endorsed the decisions taken in Helsinki. The problem with regard to the involvement of non-EU European Allies was that in case of EU-only operations, they had to be invited by Council decision,

---

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Please note that with the Nice European Council, the term ESDP started to replace CESDP. At the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 and onwards, the term CESDP had no longer been used officially. With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the term CSDP replaced the ESDP.
and because decisions could only be taken by unanimity in the realm of the ESDP, only one EU member state would be able to block their participation. This was a serious concern for Turkey because in WEU, only a simple majority of the full members could block its participation. It was due to the non-EU European Allies’ loss of their WEU associate membership rights and the EU’s inadequacy in replacing them that Turkey blocked the EU’s assured access to NATO assets and capabilities, which was the major requirement for the Union to take on crisis management operations.

Turkey was also concerned about any ESDP operation to be conducted in Turkey’s geographical proximity or in an area where Turkey had significant national interests. Especially, EU-only operations to be conducted in such areas without Turkey’s participation could create serious problems for the country. In this regard, Turkey wanted its voice to be heard when the EU planned such operations. Turkey also needed assurances that no ESDP operation would be conducted against it. On the other hand, the Helsinki and Nice arrangements meant a downgrading of the country’s role in European security and defense because its WEU associate membership rights were not replaced adequately. Finally, Turkey was also concerned about the worst-case scenario, that only one EU member state would be able to block its participation in EU-only operations. With Greece as a full member of the EU and Cyprus – which Turkey does not recognize as a state – preparing to become one in 2004, Turkey had considerable worries in that regard. On those grounds, Turkey insisted not to give the EU assured access to NATO assets and capabilities and asked for NAC decision on a case-by-case basis while the EU insisted on assured access. Turkey’s stance also led to criticisms against the country that it was rather inflexible and uncompromising.¹²

A closer look at the facts listed above shows that the essence of the problem regarding Turkey and the ESDP was loss of rights that were not replaced adequately. Surely, no one could expect the EU to give Turkey exactly the same rights that it had as a WEU Associate Member. This is because WEU and the EU were different organizations with distinct decision-making procedures and membership statuses. WEU had a unique and rather flexible membership structure. The EU, on the other hand, only has full members and no other types of membership. It was obvious that the EU would not be able to integrate the non-EU European Allies on the same basis as what they had in WEU. Nonetheless, it could at least design mechanisms similar to those of WEU, for example, making the participation of non-EU European Allies in EU-only operations possible through Council invitation to be decided by simple majority instead of unanimity, or their involvement in European Defense

Agency possible by simple majority voting. In principle, the EU votes by unanimity in the ESDP realm. Nonetheless, considering that while taking on WEU’s functions and leading to its demise, the EU had caused a loss of rights; a special procedure could have been adopted and this might have been made possible by a special European Council decision to be followed by several Council decisions taken by simple majority. Such options were discarded and the solution found for the non-EU European Allies’ involvement—the Berlin Plus Arrangements—could survive only for a very short period of time. The following section analyses the developments that took place after the parties agreed on the arrangements regarding EU access to NATO assets and capabilities and the non-EU European Allies’ involvement.

**Berlin Plus Arrangements and the Launch of Berlin Plus Missions**

On 24-25 October 2002, the Brussels European Council set the modalities regarding the involvement of non-EU European Allies. The document adopted in this summit is known as the Nice Implementation Document. The decisions of the Brussels European Council also led to an exchange of letters between the Secretary Generals of NATO and the EU in December 2002, as well as the decisions of the Copenhagen European Council of 12-13 December 2002. These arrangements set the ground for a final solution. The solution was declared on 16 December 2002 in an EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP which based the relations between NATO and the EU on partnership, effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency, equality, and due regard for the decision making autonomy and interests of the two organizations, respect for the interests of the members of the EU and NATO, peaceful settlement of disputes and not to use force and the threat of force in their relations according to the principles of the UN Charter. Only those members of the EU which are either members of NATO or partners within the PfP framework would be able to participate in NATO-EU cooperation within the framework of arrangements and strategic cooperation brought about by these arrangements. Therefore, Malta and Cyprus were left out of any cooperation between NATO and the EU.

Non-EU European Allies were also given more involvement opportunities. Nonetheless, these arrangements still fell short of what was provided by NATO’s Washington Summit decisions. According to the Berlin Plus Arrangements, non-EU European Allies would be consulted in case of the possibility of an EU operation in their geographical proximity or which might affect their interests in a significant way. Furthermore, they would be able to participate in EU exercises on the same basis as their participation in an EU operation. The principles provided

---


14 The term “Berlin” in “Berlin Plus Arrangements” refers to a former arrangement in NATO, the modalities of which were decided at NATO’s Berlin Ministerial (3 June 1996), and which allowed for the European Allies (thus, WEU) to use the Alliance’s assets and capabilities (through the Combined Joint Task Forces) where the Alliance as a whole was not engaged.
for the non-EU European Allies’ participation in EU operations in the Helsinki European Council decisions were maintained in the Berlin Plus Arrangements. The EU, on the other hand, would have assured access to a predetermined set of non-strategic NATO assets and capabilities, while the ESDP would not be used against an Ally. The Berlin Plus arrangements were completed on 17 March 2003 through the adoption of numerous classified agreements.

After the completion of the Berlin Plus Arrangements, it seemed as if the issue was settled for some time, and the ESDP could finally become -de facto- operational in 2003. The EU could launch its first police operation in Bosnia on 1 January 2003 and its first military crisis management operation in Macedonia, Concordia, on 31 March 2003. Concordia was the first EU operation to be conducted through the use of NATO assets and capabilities; i.e., through resort to Berlin Plus arrangements. The Concordia mission replaced NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony and the EU used NATO Headquarters, SHAPE, in Mons, Belgium as the operation headquarters. Turkey also contributed to Operation Concordia with a contingent. Concordia was completed on 15 December 2003 and it was deemed as a successful operation.

Succeeding NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, Operation Althea was launched on 2 December 2004 as the EU’s second mission conducted through the implementation of Berlin Plus arrangements. Althea is the only ongoing Berlin Plus mission and it is also the EU’s biggest military operation. Turkey has contributed to Althea and as of January 2011, with 276 personnel on the ground, it provides the second largest contribution to the Operation. Althea is also regarded as a success by some analysts, who claim that it is upon the experience of both Concordia and Althea that the Union could “launch and conduct more and more autonomous missions” and advance “its own profile as a visible international actor in the realm of crisis management.” Albeit at a small scale, the EU has deployed numerous military and civilian crisis missions, especially in Africa and Asia and developed a significant civilian crisis management capability so far. Non-EU European Allies have also contributed to some of those missions to different degrees.

**Turkish and Greek Cypriot Vetoes**

Despite the success of the two Berlin Plus missions, the problems over NATO-EU cooperation resurfaced upon the membership of Cyprus in the EU. Berlin Plus arrangements mainly rested on the premise that non-NATO and non-PfP EU Member States –Malta and Cyprus– would not participate in NATO-EU

---

17 Ibid.
cooperation and would not sign the security agreements necessary for such participation. When the Berlin Plus arrangements were adopted, everyone actually knew that Cyprus would become a member of the EU in 2004. This means that the Union should have agreed on the Berlin Plus arrangements keeping such a prospect in mind and acting accordingly: i.e., it should not have promised anything to NATO and non-EU European Allies that it would not be able to keep one and a half years later. At least, the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* would suggest that. Nevertheless, as part of what can be called a trend of the EU, not keeping its contractual liabilities towards Turkey, the Union discarded its promises in Berlin Plus arrangements when Cyprus became a full member in May 2004. The EU now claims that Cyprus cannot be left out of NATO-EU cooperation because it has become an EU member. Basing this claim on Union solidarity, it “refuses to engage in dialogue with NATO without all the EU members sitting around the table.”

Upon such EU insistence, Turkey has blocked the participation of Cyprus in the NATO-EU cooperation and its conclusion of a security agreement with NATO. Cyprus, on the other hand, blocks the signing of the EU-Turkey Security Agreement and Turkey’s participation in the European Defense Agency (EDA) through the adoption of the document for administrative arrangements. Cyprus also blocks EU-NATO negotiations on any issue other than the Berlin Plus operations in the absence of itself and Malta. Therefore, currently, only the technical details of Operation Althea can be discussed and “there is practically no meaningful dialogue between NATO and the EU on emerging threats.”

Turkey has actually showed some flexibility in that regard and agreed on informal meetings between NATO and the EU with the participation of Malta and Cyprus but, this time, France claimed that such important security matters could not be discussed in informal meetings and blocked them. It is, however, debatable whether France takes on such a stance for the reason that it states - that such important security matters cannot be discussed in informal meetings - or for pursuing its own agenda towards a more autonomous CSDP. This brings us to the question of Europeanist decoupling in NATO.

**The Problem of Decoupling in NATO**

Decoupling in NATO does not necessarily have to be through an explicit EU caucusing in the Alliance where all the EU European Allies would act on behalf of the Union as well as on their own behalf. It suffices for some EU European Allies - the Europeanists - to pursue the Union’s interests and act in such a way to

---

19 Ibid.
achieve more autonomy for the CSDP in the EU and also from within NATO. There have been several attempts of some Europeanist Allies to that effect. The first act of decoupling and what can also be regarded as duplication was the Tervuren Summit - the so-called “Praline Summit” - of April 2003. In the divisive atmosphere caused by the U.S. invasion of Iraq, France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg proposed the creation of autonomous European headquarters for conducting EU-only ESDP operations. Upon serious reaction from the U.S., the UK brokered a deal, in November 2003, which led to the establishment of a European planning cell within SHAPE and the creation of a civil-military cell within the EUMS. The Civil-Military Cell was tasked to create an EU Operations Centre in 2004 and the latter became operational in June 2007. The attempt to establish an autonomous European headquarters was clearly against the spirit of Berlin Plus arrangements and it could lead to duplication of NATO assets and capabilities. Furthermore, it reflected the primacy of the EU in some European Allies’ agenda. It was more important for them to develop an autonomous ESDP than to keep NATO together when the Alliance was obviously witnessing a rift over the Iraq War, which could escalate into an existential crisis.

Operation Artemis, an EU-only operation, on the other hand, was significant in the sense that no prior consultations were made with NATO and the U.S. when it was launched in June 2003. This meant that NATO’s status as the first resort in conducting military crisis management operations was challenged despite the clear statement in the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council that the Union would launch and conduct EU-led military crisis management operations “where NATO as a whole is not engaged.” In another case - Darfur, Sudan - things got even worse: NATO and the EU could not agree on a joint operation and conducted two separate missions in June 2005 to support the African Union’s mission there and this was rather seen as a sign of the competition and turf-battles between the two organizations by some analysts. The French, German, and Greek insistence for an EU-only mission and the Dutch, British, and Italian preference for a NATO operation were especially important in this case. Contrary to the Berlin Plus arrangements, the EU also did not consult Turkey before launching two crisis management operations in the country’s geographical proximity: Iraq and Georgia. Nevertheless, through a narrow interpretation of the

22 Also, the U.S. preference for entering into bilateral contacts with its Allies in its interventions after September 11 attacks, rather than going through NATO and its clear preference for coalitions of the willing did not help in raising the Alliance’s profile, and sometimes even led to criticisms against U.S. decoupling from NATO. See: Simon Duke, “The Future of NATO-EU Relations: a Case of Mutual Irrelevance Through Competition?,” European Integration, vol. 30, no. 1, (March 2008), p. 36.
Berlin Plus arrangements, the EU claimed that the condition of consultation in case of geographical proximity did not apply in these cases because they were civilian crisis management operations.25

The creation of EDA in 2004 has also been problematic for NATO-EU capability cooperation, a key element of the Berlin Plus arrangements. The document entitled “EU and NATO: Coherent and Mutually Reinforcing Capability Requirements,” adopted as part of the Berlin Plus arrangements, established the NATO-EU Capability Group and a number of meetings could be held between the two sides.26 Such meetings were held through the frameworks of NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment and the Union’s European Capability Action Plan.27 The creation of EDA, on the other hand, was used by some EU member states as a pretext for challenging the Berlin Plus arrangements in this regard, and suggesting a review of those arrangements.28 This reflects that at least some EU European Allies disregard their commitments under NATO and they also forget that EDA is the successor to a NATO group – the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), which was dissolved in 1992 to transfer its functions to Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) -a group created under WEU auspices. EDA took over its tasks from WEAG, to which non-EU European Allies were full members. The Cypriot veto over Turkey’s involvement in EDA is also an instance that reveals how Turkey is discriminated. It should not be forgotten that Turkey was a full member of WEAG, the predecessor to EDA. Cyprus might be using a right that it has by way of its membership of the EU but the major problem in this regard is that the EU European Allies which show solidarity with Cyprus in NATO seem to have discarded the fact that they also have commitments under NATO and they have a contractual liability not to discriminate against non-EU European Allies when creating an autonomous European defense capability. Attaching such primacy to the EU at the expense of NATO is what actually leads to a European decoupling in the Alliance.

Another problem with some Europeanist Allies is that they reject the recent calls for a “Berlin Plus in Reverse,” an arrangement which would pave the way for NATO’s use of the EU’s civilian crisis management capabilities.29 In a global context where comprehensive security has become crucial, equipping NATO with such capabilities would serve the Alliance’s quest for a new raison d’être. Nevertheless, several EU countries, led by France, have opposed such an arrangement on the ground that it “would allow NATO to venture into civil-military affairs and could thereby rival the

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
European Union’s distinctive approach to crisis management." This also shows the primacy given to the EU in the face of NATO by the Europeanist Allies. It further testifies to Varvick and Koops’s argument that the EU “relies on NATO in order to advance its own international actorness profile and assert its visibility and identity in the field of crisis management." They conclude: “This makes the European Union less and less a sui generis entity with a peculiarly inbuilt genetic code of altruistic foreign policy behaviour, but rather more and more like any other ordinary, interest-maximizing power in the international system.”

Interestingly, it is almost always France which leads the Europeanist Allies in all of these instances of decoupling in NATO. Even the French return to the Alliance’s Integrated Military Command in 2009 can be regarded as part of the country’s tendency for creating a more autonomous CSDP and have full control in NATO rather than as a move for strengthening the Alliance. On the other hand, Germany, leaving its more appropriate and useful role of a mediator between the Europeanists and Transatlanticists, has clearly sided with France after 2003 and added to the complexities in NATO-EU cooperation in this regard.

In almost every official EU text on European security and defense, there is a statement which acknowledges that the Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defense of its members and the development of the ESDP/CSDP shall not prejudice their NATO commitments. Nevertheless, this acknowledgement rarely works in reality. Therefore, “[i]t is not a coincidence that the Report of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO draws attention to the need of ‘an invocation of political will’ – ‘a renewal of vows, on the part of each member.’”

To conclude, the major problem with regard to NATO-EU cooperation goes beyond the vetoes by Turkey and Cyprus. Rather, there is a deeper and historically embedded dynamic at play: the traditional divide between Europeanists and Transatlanticists and how this leads to a decoupling in NATO. Therefore, even solving the Cyprus issue may not help overcoming the current impasse over NATO-EU cooperation. True, the Cyprus problem should be solved. But what is urgently needed is an understanding on the part of Europeanist Allies that they also have commitments towards NATO.

31 Ibid. p.125.
32 Ibid.
33 See, for example, “Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council.”