

# **TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EU MEMBERSHIP: A SECURITY PERSPECTIVE**

*Turkey's potential contributions to the EU Common Foreign and Defense Policy (CFSP) will play an important role in the decision which will be made regarding the opening of accession negotiations. Therefore, this article briefly describes the evolution of Turkey's foreign policy and analyzes whether Turkish and EU foreign policies are compatible particularly in light of the EU Security Strategy document prepared by the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana and adopted by the European Council in December 2003.*

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Turkey expects to begin accession negotiations with the European Union at the beginning of 2005. Ankara's fulfillment of the Copenhagen Political Criteria will be the basis of the decision to be made by the EU Council in December 2004. Although fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria forms the basis for beginning accession negotiations, it seems that in the case of Turkey the EU's foreign and security vision will play an important role in the decision. The aim of this assertion is not that the EU's decision will be based only on strategic choices and that the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria is no longer the primary basis of that decision. It only means that Turkey's potential contribution to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) may help balance opposition towards her full membership based on cultural-religious arguments, which are not related to the fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria.

Following the opening of accession negotiations, the CFSP chapter will need to be closed, but the importance of foreign policy integration is not limited to institutional requirements and comitology. The EU is on the verge of developing a vision/strategy for its future whose basic motives are reflected in a paper entitled "A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy" prepared by CFSP High Representative Javier Solana and adopted by the European Council in December 2003 in Brussels.

The aim of this paper is to analyze evolving Turkish and the EU foreign policies and see whether they are compatible, taking into consideration their threat assessments, policy options and objectives. Moreover, it would aim to see that the two contribute to one another and hence help the achievement of better outcomes in CFSP and ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy).

### ***The Evolution of Turkey's Foreign Policy***

Turkey's foreign policy is going through a new wave of change with the approaching EU membership perspective.

Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the primary actor in the formation of foreign policy has been the Government, mainly through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After its establishment in 1961, the National Security Council (NSC) also played an increasingly vital role in foreign policy decisions and the role of the Turkish Armed Forces' has become more apparent, especially after Turkey's membership in NATO and the establishment of the NSC.<sup>1</sup> (Although the 1982 constitution further reinforced the status of NSC and the presence of the military within the NSC, the reforms of 2003 and 2004 reversed this phenomenon.)

The impacts of public opinion, business associations and the media were limited until after the 1980s. (This issue is evaluated in the following paragraphs.)

Turkey has, for many years, based its foreign policy on defensive and reactive measures. Squeezed between regions seething with crisis, Turkey's primary intent has been to be minimally affected by the surrounding troubles. Aware of the difficulties

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<sup>1</sup> For a more in-depth analysis on the actors shaping Turkey's foreign policy see Baskin Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001).

and the delicate balances required by the geography she is situated in, Turkey pursued a reactive foreign policy rather than a proactive one.

Turkey only began producing proactive policies after the Cold War years; first with regard to the newly independent Central Asian republics with which she shared historical, ethnic, linguistic and cultural ties. However, Turkey's resources were limited. Moreover, separatist terrorism and economic crises throughout the 1990s have left her with little opportunity to do more than concentrate first and foremost on domestic issues.

During 1990s the relationship between economic affairs and foreign policy became all the more apparent. Economic crisis have increased Turkey's debts (both foreign and domestic) in a considerable manner, forcing the treasury into more borrowing in order to pay the high interest rates. International institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have increased influence over Turkey. This, in turn, somehow affected and in some cases even limited foreign policy options due to the economic realities the country faced. The financial package proposed by the US in return for Turkey's assistance and support in the second Iraq war has been instrumental in demonstrating the increasing interaction between economic affairs and foreign policy. Nevertheless, this does not mean that all policy decisions are now being made on purely economic grounds: Turkey rejected this financial package and opted to stay out of the invasion although the economy desperately needed such an injection of cash.

The 1980s witnessed the resurgence of new actors in the making of Turkish foreign policy. First, businessmen started playing a role in the shaping of foreign policy with the use of economic diplomacy by Prime Minister Özal (later President). Businessmen close to the government started joining delegations during official visits of the Prime Minister or Ministers. Turkey witnessed planes full of businessmen whose problems were being raised at official meetings accompanying state delegations and embassies making follow-ups for the first time. The interests of Turkish construction companies and textile exporters became important factors in shaping bilateral relations.

Then business associations like TUSIAD and TOBB started showing an interest in international relations as well. DEIK, the Foreign Economic Relations Board was established in 1986 by the leading business associations. Strengthening Turkey's relations with foreign countries was among DEIK's objectives<sup>2</sup>.

Turkey witnessed a rapid development of private TV channels throughout the 1990s. Eventually the media's approach to foreign policy also changed. Prior to that the only station was TRT<sup>3</sup> and it conveyed the official views on foreign policy decisions without much evaluation or criticism.

Newspaper circulation per person in Turkey (6 for 100 people)<sup>4</sup> is still very low compared to the US or Western Europe. Since foreign policy is usually an area in which mostly educated elites show an interest, the interest of the wider public interest could not be attracted through newspapers. In these situations TV is the main channel for attracting wider interest. Therefore, the media's role in foreign policy has only

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<sup>2</sup> See DEIK's objectives, [www.deik.org.tr](http://www.deik.org.tr).

<sup>3</sup> Turkish Radio and Television, autonomous but state owned.

<sup>4</sup> Pricewaterhouse Coopers, EMEA report 2004.

been visible with the proliferation of private TV channels. Discussion programs on foreign policy started finding a certain clientele and by the time of the second Iraq war foreign policy programs had become an industry and all TV channels were hosting former diplomats, academics and politicians on political analysis programs.

Up until the 1990s there were no think tanks and/or NGOs working on foreign policy issues, with the exception of the Foreign Policy Institute in Ankara<sup>5</sup>. The 1990s witnessed a rapid development of foreign policy think tanks and NGOs; with TESEV, ASAM, ARI Movement, and the foreign policy institutes of universities being the primary ones. The research and activities of these institutes and NGOs brought different approaches to foreign policy, apart from those proposed by the government (or the state establishment).

With all these developments Turkish citizens became aware of the fact that the foreign policy decisions of their government might affect them as much as decisions on domestic issues. This becomes all the more important in a developing country like Turkey where most foreign policy decisions play a decisive role in the country's economic performance as well.

All these developments and the participation of new actors have forced governments to explain more about their foreign policy decisions and to start taking public opinion into account. Hence civil society organizations have become an important element of broad consensus building.<sup>6</sup> The most illustrative example of this phenomenon has been the Turkish Parliament's vote on allowing US troops to use Turkish soil on the way to Iraq before the second war. Public opinion was so much against it that despite intense US pressure, the Parliament voted against it. (Of course this may not be the only reason for the Parliament's decision).

In parallel with these domestic developments, the international environment has also induced a change in the conduct of Turkish foreign policy. First, there is a change in Turkey's overall threat perceptions and security concerns.

#### *Relations with Greece*

With EU membership or the start of accession negotiations, problems with Greece over Aegean issues will be easier to deal with. Already since the 1999 Helsinki decision on Turkey's candidacy, there are significant improvements in that regard. The two foreign ministries have been conducting bilateral talks for some time now. The results or the achievements of these bilateral talks have not yet been made public. Although it seems there is still not full agreement, things are now at least on the right track, in a way that certainly eliminates the risks that may result in security concerns. This will be further strengthened with the start of the negotiations. With the resolution of the Aegean problems, both countries will be able to decrease their military spending. But, benefits will not be limited to that: the two countries will then be able to join efforts to further promote security and stability in the Balkans. This would visibly strengthen the EU's role in the region. Already the EU is taking over NATO operations in the Balkans; Macedonia is to be followed by Bosnia. Turkey and Greece have been active participants in these peace missions. The impact of the two countries

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<sup>5</sup> Established in 1974.

<sup>6</sup> Turan Morali, "Turkey's Security Perspectives and Perceptions," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 4.

in this region are not limited with peacekeeping operations. They have considerable economic and cultural influence as well. They are among the top investors in the region. Further cooperation between Turkey and Greece would increase stability and the EU's credibility in the region.

### *Ethnic Separatism*

The Turkish public has for a long time felt that the European countries were supporting separatist activities in Turkey and that they had a hidden agenda in that regard. In fact, a recent survey on Turkey's EU membership conducted by Dr. Hakan Yılmaz from Boğaziçi University<sup>7</sup> gives us useful hints on Turkish public opinion's views on this issue:

When asked whether European countries helped the development of separatist groups like the PKK in Turkey, a vast majority's answered in the affirmative (66.1 percent), while those who felt that Europe had played no part was only 21.4 percent (the rest were undecided or had no opinion).

When asked whether human rights reforms in Turkey are meant to divide the country, affirmative answers drop to 35.8 percent, while the dissenting percentage increases to 39.8 percent, thus surpassing the people who answered in the affirmative.

When asked whether EU membership will divide Turkey, those responding negatively increased even further to 50.8 percent, while yes answers remain at 36.5 percent.

This important survey indicates that worries regarding ethnic problems in Turkey are indeed diminished with the prospect of EU membership. Moreover the reform process is helpful for a national reconciliation in this regard. This issue which at first glance seems domestic actually has a significant effect on Turkey's foreign policy. On the one hand, it affects the country's relations with neighbors like Iran, Iraq and Syria, and on the other, it creates tension in Turkey's relations with the EU.

In this vein, Dr. Murat Somer of Koç says "If Turkish state policies and discourse, and that of the other regional and international actors, signal to Kurds that the Turkish and Kurdish identities are mutually exclusive categories with rival interests, radical shifts may occur in Turkish Kurds' social and political identities and preferences. If state policies promote these identities as complements with compatible interests, radical shifts are unlikely and Turkey can play a more constructive regional role."<sup>8</sup>

Similarly, Prof. Ziya Öniş states the following: "Turkey's changing domestic and external contexts in recent years have facilitated a striking shift in its position from a coercive to a potentially benign or constructive regional power. As Turkey moves away from procedural and closer to substantive democracy in line with the EU norms, it will also be better positioned in terms of its ability to resolve its Kurdish conflict through an extension of citizenship rights. A more democratic Turkey which is closely aligned with the EU is also likely to develop a more restrained position with respect to

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<sup>7</sup> "Türkiye'de Avrupa Şüphesizliği, Türk Halkının AB Konusundaki Kaygıları ve Korkuları," a survey by Hakan Yılmaz, Boğaziçi University.

<sup>8</sup> Murat Somer, "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional Implications," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 58, No. 2.

Iraqi Kurds. This in turn will be an important contribution to regional peace and stability.”<sup>9</sup>

Therefore, it can be predicted that Turkey’s EU membership prospects will also help the development of a constructive role in the whole of the Middle East.

Although a member of the western alliance for decades, Turkey has generally felt as if she were left alone in this troubled region. Her NATO membership lacked political support, and military backing became questionable during the Cuban missile crisis and with the Johnson letters on the Cyprus problem. The Soviet threat loomed larger throughout the Cold War period. Problems with Greece remained unresolved and brought the two allies to the verge of war on more than one occasion. Her southern and eastern neighbors have unstable, even rogue regimes. Moreover, Turkey alienated herself from the Muslim world on her path towards westernization and democracy.

With EU membership, Turkey will have the possibility of extending the stability she has established beyond her borders and hence be able to contribute in creating a better environment. The more successful Turkey is in exporting this stability, the fewer hard security concerns will arise from the region. Indeed, Turkey’s southeastern neighbors support Turkey’s EU membership. President Muhammed Hatemi of Iran and President Beshar Esad of Syria have made reference to the issue on different occasions. Of course this approach does not aim at suggesting that Turkey’s EU membership will, in itself, be the sudden cure of all illnesses in this part of the world. Nevertheless, it does attract attention to the fact that with Turkey’s membership, the Middle East and Caucasus will be direct neighbors with the EU, thus creating the possibility of more direct influence over and interest in the region’s problems. If this is combined with Turkey’s regional role and influence, this increasing EU involvement shall contribute to the extension of stability.

### ***Significant Foreign Policy Decisions Towards Accession***

There have been several indicative developments signaling a foreign policy shift towards EU membership in the recent years.

#### *ESDP*

The first positive and indicative development was regarding the ESDP. There was a long lasting debate between the EU and Turkey on how to develop ESDP. Since the St. Malo compromise<sup>10</sup> between France and the UK, the EU is willing to develop the ESDP within its own institutional structures. The building of that EU capacity requires, however, the use of NATO assets and capabilities. This is not only part of the compromise between France and the UK but also a necessity, given the significant cost of such duplication. Turkey indeed has been supportive of an ESDI (European Security and Defence Initiative). On the other hand, she was worried about being left out of European security structures, since she was not a member of the EU. Therefore, Turkey was willing to secure her participation in European crisis management mechanisms and was expecting the EU to develop a mechanism which would

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<sup>9</sup> Ziya Öniş, “Turkey and Middle East After September 11: The Importance of the EU Dimension,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 4.

<sup>10</sup> Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, Saint Malo-France, 3-4 December 1998.

guarantee her rights. Nevertheless, the Nice provisions<sup>11</sup> developed by the EU in December 2000 fell short of addressing Turkey's expectations and worries. Turkey had doubts about how to develop the NATO-EU relationship because she was feeling uncomfortable with the Nice provisions adopted by the EU. On the other hand, Turkey was aware of the fact that this problem was harming her relations with the EU. However she could not accept being left out of European security structures. Parties worked to find a solution to the problem and finally - after being blocked for almost a year by Greece - an agreement was reached at the end of 2002. In short, the agreement is instrumental in laying down the parameters of the NATO-EU cooperation framework. The essence is that non-EU European Allies will be able to participate in EU-led operations and in their preparations where NATO assets and capabilities are used. In operations where the EU does not use NATO assets and capabilities, those non-EU European Allies may participate upon the invitation from the EU Council. In any case the agreement assures that the sensitivities of all European Allies are taken into consideration by the EU via a well-developed consultation mechanism. The Helsinki Summit decision on Turkey's candidacy and subsequent developments in Turkey-EU relationship laid the groundwork for such an agreement. Should Turkey not be given the go-ahead regarding membership, it would have been extremely difficult to continue this policy.

The conclusion of NATO-EU arrangements opened the way for deeper cooperation between the two organizations and the EU assumed control of operation "Allied Harmony" in Macedonia on 31 March 2003. The cooperation will now take on a new perspective with the EU taking over SFOR in Bosnia from NATO.

Turkey participated in the EU military operation "Concordia" in Macedonia with 11 personnel. Turkey is also contributing to the EU police mission "Proxima" in the same country and this contribution is expected to increase to around 50 policemen.<sup>12</sup> Turkey is also active in the EU police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina with 14 police officers. Similarly Turkey has been participating in the NATO operation SFOR in Bosnia with a strong contingent and is expected to continue this contribution with the EU taking over the operation.

#### *Iraq War*

Another indication came during the preparatory stages of the Iraq war in March 2003. The war has caused tremendous difficulties for Turkey and for the newly elected AKP government. On the one hand, there was US pressure to involve Turkey in the operation to acquire higher logistics and operational capabilities. On the other, public opinion in Turkey was adamantly against a US invasion of Iraq, and moreover public opinion was predominantly against Turkey's involvement, be it through logistical support allowing American troops to use Turkish soil on the way to Iraq, or through sending Turkish troops into the operation theatre. The government struggled between the two and finally the Parliament rejected the bill tabled by the government for Turkish support for the US in the opening of a northern front through the use of Turkish soil. This has obviously caused tension and trauma in relations with the US. On the other hand, Turkey's decision was welcomed by most EU members, particularly by France and Germany who were severely criticizing this unilateral

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<sup>11</sup> Nice European Council meeting, Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, 9 December 2000.

<sup>12</sup> See [www.ntvmsnbc.com](http://www.ntvmsnbc.com), 22 July 2004.

decision of the US. Given sensitivities on northern Iraq, the instability due to a war in a neighboring country and the economy's delicate debt financing, without the prospects of EU membership there would have been much less incentive for Turkey to resist US pressure. In other words, this decision could only be justified as a building block on the way to full membership.

### *Cyprus*

A third example signaling the shift in foreign policy is Turkey's approach to a solution in Cyprus. If there were genuine efforts to solve the Cyprus problem on the part of Turkey in line with the Annan Plan at the beginning of 2004, this was not the case due to the fact that the southern part of the island was becoming a member of the EU, but because Turkey expects to begin accession negotiations with the Union by the end of the year. As laid down by the latest ERT report: "Ankara grasped the point that not simply good will but an unambiguous dedication to produce a settlement was a precondition for progress in its own negotiations with Europe. In 2004, for the first time in thirty years, a Turkish government committed itself to a Cyprus solution, and soon found it had the bulk of public opinion behind it. No group followed the ups and downs of negotiations more closely than investors on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, with each step forward producing a modest rally and every step back a small decline."<sup>13</sup>

The EU membership prospect is helping Turkey to pursue more independent policies. So far the shifts in Turkish foreign policy indicate further convergence and complementation with EU policies. An in depth analysis regarding this phenomenon is provided by Michael Emerson and Natalie Tocci in their working paper entitled "Turkey as Bridgehead and Spearhead: Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy."

Overall as a candidate country on the verge of starting accession negotiations, Turkey attaches importance to conducting a foreign policy compatible with her membership prospects. In this vein, according to the results of a study conducted by Turkey's Foreign Ministry, Turkey aligned herself with 87 percent of EU statements, draft conclusions or declarations during the first half of 2003.<sup>14</sup> These changes in approach are important in the sense that they show how Turkey values her membership to the Union.

### ***Security Matters***

Western European States, since the beginning of the Cold War, in other words for more than 50 years, have been working to establish a collective security structure. During the Cold War years, NATO has been the primary organ of this structure.

With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the nature of the threats to European security has changed significantly. NATO has undergone a series of reforms to adapt itself to the new security environment, primarily by adding peacekeeping instruments to its traditional defense structures.

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<sup>13</sup> "Turkey-A New Corporate World for Europe", Report prepared by the Turkish-EU Enlargement Council of the European Round Table of Industrialists, July 2004.

<sup>14</sup> Oğuz Demiralp, "The added value of Turkish membership to European Foreign Policy," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 4.

At the same time, efforts by Western European countries for a genuinely European security structure have also gained pace during the 1990s. The European Union has included Common Foreign and Security Policy in its three pillared structure with the Maastricht Treaty in 1991.

CFSP has continued evolving since then. The introduction of qualified majority voting, establishment of a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff, and finalization of NATO-EU Consultation and Cooperation arrangements (the so-called *Berlin +*) have been major achievements achieved throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, yet a strategic vision for the EU was still pending. Finally the EU adopted a Security Strategy at its summit meeting in Brussels in December 2003. This document prepared by CFSP High Representative Javier Solana is named “A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy.”

It would be wise to go through the document to see whether the Union’s strategic foreign policy priorities match those of Turkey.

Let us examine whether or not the threats are equally valid for Turkey, if the objectives match those of Turkey and if Turkey can contribute in the policy implications.

#### *Terrorism*

While listing the key threats the Solana document describes terrorism as “...posing a strategic threat to the whole of Europe” and draws attentions to the fact that Europe is both a target and a base for terrorism. It therefore calls for “concerted European action.”

If Turkey was to list threats she faces, she would undoubtedly start with terrorism. On top of having suffered from ethnic separatist and religious extremist terrorism, Turkey was also a target of Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorism in November 2003 in the bombings of two synagogues, the British Consulate and the Headquarters of a bank in Istanbul which left more than 50 dead and hundreds wounded.

Turkey has long argued that fighting terrorism is only possible through international cooperation. It is now well known that terrorism has significant links with organized crime, failing states and drug trafficking (see the following sections). Indeed, the financial aspect of funding terrorism is among these linkages, all of which make international cooperation all the more relevant and necessary.

Terrorist attacks on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001 caused a paradigm shift in world politics. Threat perceptions have changed as well as ways to tackle them. 9/11 has triggered a renewed approach to security in the US. Although there was widespread sympathy towards the US and a shared anger against terrorism after 9/11, when it came to the ways of tackling the new threats there were significant differences in opinion. The events and the changed threat perception pushed the US towards a certain unilateralism. European states favored multilateralism in general although differences of opinion surfaced with war against Iraq.

Two and a half years later, the March 11<sup>th</sup> attacks in Spain have become the 9/11 of the European continent. This has once again been an indication of the rapid

development of this new form of threat, leaving all in a vulnerable position. Terrorism today respects no limits and no boundaries. Terrorist organizations throughout the world have managed to develop a complex web of relationships with each other, which in return gives them the possibility to operate even in remote areas away from their power base.

Today the EU should be able to take a firm stance against this evil of terrorism. The Security Strategy document lays the ground for that, by a strong emphasis on the importance of multilateral approaches and by urging the EU to act more actively and in cooperation with partners.

The fight against terrorism will undoubtedly be among the leading issues on the international agenda. The complexity of the organizational structure of most terrorist organizations will increase the need of cooperation among states and international organizations. Turkey and the European Union both have much to gain if they cooperate in the fight against terrorism. The beginning of accession negotiations will accelerate and deepen this cooperation.

#### *Weapons of Mass Destruction*

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) particularly in the Middle East is a serious concern both for the EU and Turkey. Indeed the strategy document says “Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security... We are now entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East.”

There are three major and imminent threats related with the proliferation of WMD. One is the spread of biological, chemical and radiological materials with the advance in sciences. These weapons are a serious source of concern, particularly in the Middle East. The horrible memory of the use of biological weapons in Halepche in the north of Iraq by Saddam is still fresh in everyone’s memory. Turkey bitterly remembers the sad events that happened near her eastern border and hence is fearful of a spread.

The second type of threat arises with the spread of missile and nuclear technologies. These technologies and certain materials used in the production of nuclear weapons, such as enriched uranium, have proliferated rapidly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Besides the diffusion of missile technology from North Korea, leaks regarding nuclear technology from Pakistan have made the situation more urgent than ever. Attempts to make the Middle East an area free of WMD have so far failed. Israel became the first nuclear power in the region and Iran’s nuclear program continues to be a concern. The EU has engaged in a series of talks with the Iranian authorities through British, French and German Foreign Ministers. Whether these diplomatic attempts will prove useful remains to be seen. Nevertheless, one cannot help but think that this diplomatic attempt might have been better if the EU had been institutionally represented through High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana. His presence within the team which negotiated with the Iranians would have been a demonstration of the institutionalization of the CFSP.

Developments in this important neighboring country are carefully watched by Turkey. A WMD race in the Middle East is the last thing Turkey wants. With Turkey’s membership, the EU’s borders will stretch to Iran, Iraq and Syria in the Middle East.

This would most probably mean further responsibilities for the EU, but at the same time would mean further influence in the region. Time will show whether the EU has the political will or finds the means to become a more strategic foreign policy actor in the region. As the latest report prepared by the Friends of Europe puts it, “Turkish accession will extend and deepen EU foreign policy interests in its surrounding regions. But the Middle East, Black Sea and Caucuses are regions that the EU in any event is going to have to engage with more strongly given its own foreign policy and security interests.”<sup>15</sup>

A third threat related to WMDs is the one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. The strategy document stresses “...a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.” This third dimension of course has no physical limitations or boundaries as in the first two. Intelligence gathering and sharing seem the first and foremost way to tackle this threat, particularly considering that the internal boundaries no longer exist within the EU. There is much that Turkey and the EU can do together, starting with intelligence sharing.

### *Regional Conflicts*

With the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the European continent suddenly found itself in the middle of regional conflicts without having the necessary means to deal with them. Moreover, there was the problem of political will and choices within the EU. The approach of France and the UK was very different from that of Germany when it came to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and independence and recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.

The events in the former Yugoslavia have been instrumental in showcasing the dangers brought with regional conflicts. As laid down in the strategy document, regional conflicts “destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organized crime. Regional conflict can fuel the demand for WMD.”

Coping with the regional conflicts be it in the Balkans, the Middle East or the Caucasus goes beyond the capabilities of any single state. Taking into consideration the linkages between regional conflicts and drug trafficking, drug trafficking and terrorism,<sup>16</sup> terrorism and the dangers of the proliferation of WMD or terrorism and failing states, the necessity for cooperation becomes more evident. Turkey stands next to the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, all of which pose potential threats to the security of Europe. Tackling regional conflicts requires the involvement of a maximum number of regional countries which usually have cultural, historical, ethnical links to the problem area. These linkages if used positively might help the development of efficient policies towards sustainable solutions. Turkey is well situated to help the development of such policies as part of the EU, both with her geo-strategic location and with her links to the surrounding regions.

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<sup>15</sup> Hughes Kirsty, “Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement?” *A Friends of Europe Working Paper*, June 2004.

<sup>16</sup> Alex P. Schmid “Links Between Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: A Case of Narco-Terrorism?”, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 2.

### *State Failure*

“Nation states fail because they no longer deliver positive political goods to their people... These kinds of states - failed states and collapsed states (an extreme form)- are proliferating in number and posing larger and larger challenges to world order. They constitute security threats because of the disorder and non-state actors which they harbor. They threaten regional and global security as they create potential reservoirs for terror movements and terrorists.”<sup>17</sup> Thus the EU, alongside with the UN, OSCE and NATO should be in a position to help prevent the failure or somehow limit the negative impacts. The main prerequisite for understanding the early warning signs that a state is failing is linked to an understanding of the current events in that particular country. This in return requires a thorough analysis of the situation which can not be done properly without understanding the culture, history and the needs of the state concerned. Once again Turkey is well positioned to help carry out this analysis, with her historical and cultural ties in the regions around Europe having the potential to become a source of insecurity.

### *Organized Crime*

Finally another major threat enlisted in the strategy document is organized crime and Europe is presented as a prime target for that. Turkey is getting her share of organized crime, with drug trafficking and illegal migration among the primary problems. Today it is a fact that Turkey is located on a primary route for these kinds of activities. Despite their best efforts, Turkish authorities cannot fight this issue alone. Indeed cooperation between Turkish and EU authorities has increased over the last years and is producing good results. Accession negotiations are the tool to deepening that interaction.

### *Objectives of the Solana Document and Policy Implications*

The Solana document enlists three strategic objectives of the EU to defend its security and to promote its values in the face of the above mentioned threats. First the European Union must be active in addressing the threats which are no longer purely military, and, therefore, requires a set of tools which includes intelligence, police, judicial, economic and others, in addition to the traditional military ones.

Secondly it talks about building security in our neighborhood; “Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.” The document explicitly makes reference to the Balkans, Caucasus, the Middle East and the Mediterranean Area. By doing so, it implicitly recognizes that for the time being the EU’s actions might not aim at reaching further remote areas such as North Korea.

Third, it places a strong emphasis on multilateralism by saying “The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule based international order is our objective.”

The policy implications of the three strategic objectives require a more active, more capable, more coherent EU which works with its partners.

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<sup>17</sup> Rotberg Robert I., “Weak and Failing States: Critical New Security Issues,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* Vol. 3, No. 2.

Let us see if Turkey shares the strategic objectives and if she could help realize the policy implications tied to them. Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs summarizes the primary objective as follows: "The primary objective of Turkish foreign policy is to help secure and nurture a peaceful, stable, prosperous and cooperative regional and international environment that is conducive to human development at home as well as in the neighboring countries and beyond."<sup>18</sup>

To start with, the geographic priorities enlisted in the strategy document are all in Turkey's neighborhood: The Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean area. Emerson and Tocci have examined Turkey's foreign policy in these areas in quite some detail in a separate working paper, therefore I will refrain from making a similar analysis. It shall suffice to say that obviously the same geographies constitute priority for Turkey as well. As a neighbor, Turkey has a complex web of relationships with these regions, including, commercial, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and historical links. These regions and Turkey have a reciprocal influence over each other. Instability in these geographies is indeed a security threat for Turkey and vice versa. Increased stability offers more opportunities for enhanced cooperation. The beginning of accession negotiations with Turkey will provide additional incentives of cooperation in these regions. Indeed the closer the foreign policies of Turkey and the EU become, the more influence the EU will have for extending stability. Turkey could then play an instrumental role benefiting the EU, with her geo-strategic advantages. These benefits will not be limited to merely reducing security concerns, but will also be inclusive of extended economic and commercial activity.

Since the geographical priorities match, how then can Turkey contribute to making the EU more active, more capable and more coherent? The answer to the question partly lies in Turkey's past contributions to peace and security.

Ambassador Uğur Ziyal, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes reference to Turkey's contributions in the following statement: "As one of the founding members of the UN, Turkey has always been committed to upholding the universal goals and principles enshrined in the UN Charter. It has a formidable record in active contributions to the preservation of regional and global peace and stability. Turkey's commitment to international stabilization efforts dates back to the Korean War...Currently Turkey takes part in several UN peacekeeping operations. It has participated in numerous operations and missions, notably in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosova, Georgia, East Timor, North Korea, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo... assumed the leadership of ISAF for 8 months in Afghanistan..." This description of Turkey is one marked by "multilateralism," one which "works with partners" and one "active" for the preservation of peace and stability around the world.

When discussing potential contributions to international security, there appears to be two sets of complimentary capabilities: hard-core military and civilian solutions. It is generally accepted that military interventions cannot create long lasting stability and security if not supported by civilian tools which eventually help create a civil society capable of managing the country in the aftermath of the international mission. On the

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<sup>18</sup> Turkish Foreign Policy: A Synopsis, see [www.mfa.gov.tr](http://www.mfa.gov.tr)

other hand, sometimes it is impossible to extend civilian contributions, without having credible military capabilities deployed in the theatre of operation to control the chaos and stop the bloodshed.

The EU should be ready to deploy both types of capabilities. A European Defense Policy is needed as part of an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy. The “Proposal for a White Paper in European Defense” published by the EU Institute for Security Studies<sup>19</sup> makes reference on one hand to the need for very mobile, flexible and rapid forces for expeditionary intervention and, on the other, for crisis management peacekeeping forces sustainable for long periods of time. There may be cases where both are needed as part of a single military operation. In order to answer these different and extensive military needs Europe needs to bring together collective capabilities. Turkey has quite a lot to offer the EU in these grounds. Indeed her contributions on hard security issues are well known. Turkey, a member of the western alliance since 1952, was on the frontlines throughout the Cold War with her powerful army. Turkey’s contributions will not be limited to military resources, but could also be of logistical nature due to her geographic proximity to most potential crisis regions which are a priority to the EU. However, there seem to be some obstacles to genuine Turkish contributions. The main obstacle lies with the institutional set-up. Since it is not yet a member of the EU, Turkey cannot fully contribute to the shaping of CFSP/ESDP. However, one would like to be fully involved if they are to contribute. This is particularly valid if the issue at stake is foreign policy, security and defense. The beginning of accession negotiations may provide opportunities to overcome this obstacle by including Turkey in the CFSP/ESDP mechanisms even prior to full membership. Creation of such flexibility would first and foremost serve the EU. This would also help make the EU “more coherent” as asked in the strategy document, by embracing all willing to contribute. This would avoid misunderstandings as well. A comprehensive CFSP cannot be developed with institutional arrangements that are too rigid.

As for civilian contributions, the EU should feel more comfortable in the international scenes. The universal values which the EU has been a pioneer in promoting, such as democracy, human and minority rights, and the rule of law are all instruments of a “human security” approach. The EU, therefore, is well placed to play an important role in its neighborhood. Although Turkey is generally known to have contributed to international peace and security mainly through her military capabilities, she nevertheless has significant civilian contributions as well. Her participation in police missions in Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia, deployment of civilian personnel for the operation of Kabul International Airport and civilian contributions to OSCE missions are just a few that could be named. Yet Turkey’s contributions to “human security” could and should increase. As we move towards full membership, there will be increased opportunities to make use of the civilian tools within the sphere of a developing CFSP. The developments regarding the involvement of civilian actors in shaping Turkish foreign policy provides the necessary basis for that.

Another aspect, which requires evaluation, is diplomatic capabilities. The Solana Document draws attentions to the following: “Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication.” This

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<sup>19</sup> “European Defence- A Proposal for a White Paper,” *EUISS*, May 2004.

better understanding and communication is indeed the essence of success in most cases. With the deep-rooted linkages she has with neighboring countries, Turkey is well positioned to help EU understanding and communications.

Overall Turkey has the military, civilian and diplomatic resources to help make the EU more capable. With the opening of accession negotiations, cooperation with the EU will be further strengthened and fruitful results will be observed even prior to Turkey's full membership.

*What Kind of CFSP/ESDP and What Future for the EU and Turkey?*

It is now clear that the challenges faced by the European Union require concerted actions. The objectives set forth in the Solana Strategy Document cannot be met without an effective CFSP and ESDP. Moreover, an EU weak in foreign and security issues can not encourage the US to act more multilaterally. This will in turn only lead to a further deterioration of the security concerns we all have today.

The "Wider Europe-Neighborhood" initiative<sup>20</sup> together with the security strategy aims at ensuring security and stability around Europe. When we take into consideration the complex relationship between different threats, it is not difficult to realize that instability around Europe has an immediate impact on European citizens as well. Indeed, EU citizens are well aware of the fact and therefore support the development of a CFSP. Charles Grant, the Director of the Center for European Reform writes the following: "Opinion Polls show that the public is more appreciative of EU involvement in defense policy than in most areas. According to the February 2004 Eurobarometer poll, 70 percent of EU citizens support a common defense and security policy, while 19 percent do not; there is a majority in favor of the principle of a common defense and security policy in every member state. Britain included."<sup>21</sup>

Therefore, an effective CFSP/ESDP will have to be developed to tackle the many challenges. If the EU does not reach out to the troubled regions bearing potential security threats and help increase stability there, sooner or later the problems arising in these regions - be it terrorism, organized crime or any other form of insecurity - will affect the EU. Such a situation would inevitably have negative economic repercussions as well.

EU-NATO relations will continue to play an important role in the development of the ESDP. Already the achievements of the so-called Berlin + arrangements have fostered this relationship: EU has taken over the NATO operation in Macedonia and is getting ready to take over SFOR in Bosnia. Yet, the achievements in EU-NATO cooperation do not mean that everything is working perfectly. There is always room for improvement, particularly if the EU is willing to further develop its capabilities. Turkey's membership to the EU will certainly be a facilitating factor in the development of the EU-NATO relationship.

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<sup>20</sup> "Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours," *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament*, COM (2003) 104 final, 11.3.2003

<sup>21</sup> Charles Grant, "European Defence: Why the EU Should Play a Bigger Role," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 2.

CFSP and ESDP encompass two different but complementary aspects: the development of a defense policy and the development of civilian and military assets for strengthening international security. Indeed, the new EU Constitution refers to a Common Security and Defense Policy, thus in a way it brings together the CFSP and ESDP. This may be considered an important achievement. On the other hand, it poses the following question: Will the EU aim to become a great power by primarily improving its defense capabilities (entailing a certain rivalry with the US) or will it concentrate first on developing its capabilities for improving human security? If differences of opinion between member states could be overcome the two concepts are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the resources - both human and financial - that the EU can allocate to the development of CFSP are considered to be limited. A healthy EU-NATO relationship and deepened cooperation may also be part of the solution to the question of “defense policy for greater Europe as opposed to a human security policy.”

Turkey's contributions to the EU will increase with the development of a credible CFSP and ESDP. This is an area where Turkey already possess accumulated assets. Some of these assets are natural ones, such as the geo-strategic location, while others have been developed over time, such as military and civilian capabilities. It would not be wrong to assume that an EU keen on developing its CFSP and ESDP would be more interested in having Turkey as a full member.

### *Conclusions*

Turkey expects to begin accession negotiations with the EU in 2005. The European Council will consider the matter at its meeting in December 2004. The European Council's decision will be based on a Commission report evaluating the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria.

Nevertheless, the European Council decision will not be a bureaucratic rubber stamp on the Commission's recommendation. The decision will mainly be of political nature and it will have to take into consideration the potential contributions of Turkey to the EU. In that regard, Turkey's contributions to CFSP and ESDP will become instrumental in this strategic decision.

As a member of NATO since 1952, Turkey has contributed directly to Europe's security during the Cold War years. With the western alliance, as a flank country Turkey played an instrumental role in addressing the Soviet threat. Her strong army was a reassurance against the Soviet army.

In the meanwhile, Turkey has also managed to adapt herself to the new state of affairs, not only operationally but also philosophically. Traditional decision-making mechanisms of the Cold War years have gradually been replaced with more participatory decision-making mechanisms with the involvement of new civic actors such as NGOs and the businessmen. The media's role has also increased, particularly through TV. Overall the public awareness regarding foreign policy has increased. This has led to a domestic environment more conducive to reassessment and revaluation of traditional aspects of Turkish foreign policy as well as the exploration of new avenues. The increased involvement of the public led to a more responsible, more

accountable and more transparent foreign policy framework. The dogmatic approach of the old was thus replaced by a more flexible, pragmatic and proactive approach. Turkey's stance during the Iraq war and its approach to the Annan Plan on Cyprus have been the most illustrative examples.

With the end of the Cold War, Turkey's role in European security has started to change. The risk of massive military confrontation in Europe has given way to threats like regional conflicts, ethnic strife and terrorism. While at first this seemed to diminish Turkey's significance in security matters, it quickly became apparent that to the contrary the development of asymmetric threats around Europe have put Turkey in a more central position. Her geo-strategic location is not the only reason for this central role. The democracy developed in this country is an example hard to find in this part of the world. With this statement, I do not mean to present Turkey as a model in the region. To the contrary, the presentation of Turkey as a model has inherent dangers. The sensitivities between the countries of the region requires more elaborate approaches, different for every country and possibly unique. Nevertheless, Turkey could well be a facilitator, without directly being a model. The facilitator role is not one Turkey can assume alone: EU will have an instrumental role.

However this role is dependent on the EU's plans for its own future. If the EU is keen on increasing its political influence, particularly in its own neighborhood, it will have to further develop CFSP and ESDP. The contributions of Turkey become valuable particularly at this point.

The Strategy Document prepared by the high representative, Solana, provides a sound beginning, although for the moment it does not go beyond a good will statement. This statement will have to be reinforced with political will in acting together and with operational capabilities.

Turkey's threat perceptions and geographic priorities match those listed in the Solana document. The country is well placed to help make the EU "more active" in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Mediterranean basin. For the moment neither the EU, nor Turkey can be more influential in these regions with their existing capabilities and approaches. However, the EU and Turkey have complementary tools able to produce a number of achievements, particularly in the human security field.

Increased human security, therefore, strengthens stability in Europe's neighborhood and will eventually bring prosperity and better business opportunities.

The prospect of EU membership plays an important role in Turkey's foreign and security policy decisions. With the evolution in the domestic scene and with the developments in the international environment, Turkey has managed to conduct a foreign policy compatible with that of the EU. It would have been quite difficult to go along the actual path without the prospect of full membership. Yet, Turkey has acted so without being a member, in other words without having any influence on the EU decisions, which in the end affect her. This "in between" position is not a sustainable one economically or politically without further reassurance regarding EU membership. Should the prospect of full membership be withdrawn, Turkey will either have to adopt more nationalist policies (for instance in Cyprus) or in some cases

will need to act in harmony with the US (for instance in Iraq). In the turbulent region where Turkey is situated alliances matter. If the EU is not there, others will inevitably fill in the vacuum. Similarly the EU cannot keep aiming to become a global actor in foreign policy and security issues without investing in this area. If the EU cannot even conduct a credible and a visionary foreign policy in its own neighborhood, where will it do so? Turkey's membership is a vital part of the development of the Common Foreign and Defense Policy. Beginning the accession negotiations is, therefore, critical for both the EU and for Turkey.