

THE SELF-DEFINITION OF EUROPE: WHERE DOES TURKEY STAND?

The European wide debate over Turkish accession to the European Union reached its peak with the period prior to and following the Copenhagen Summit of 2002. This article proposes that one of the major reasons behind the acceleration of the debate has been the self-definition process of Europe precipitated with the developments in the international system with the Iraq war and the final stages of enlargement to Central, Eastern and Southern Europe with the exception of Turkey who is yet to start accession negotiations. These factors, by having significant impacts on EU's foreign policy orientations, its institutional set up and the question over its identity, create an encompassing framework within which the debate over Turkey's accession can best be placed and future scenarios can be drawn.

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The European Union has long been engaged in a struggle to define itself with respect to its boundaries, its identity and its institutional structure. Whether it will develop into a supranational state with federal characteristics or remain within the boundaries of its classical intergovernmental structure; the outer edges of its expansion and the identity upon which to base its legitimacy were issues that have occupied Europe's agenda with the further widening and deepening of the Union. The upcoming inclusion of 10 new member states into the Union and the recent international developments, primarily with respect to the war in Iraq, have brought a new impetus to the Union to define itself around these issues and develop its future course.

Three major areas, namely EU foreign policy, institutional structure and identity, are hereby analysed as the main subjects of this self definition process which has crucial ramifications as to how the Union handles the Turkish accession.

Foreign Policy: The Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East

The European Union has typically been described as a civilian power in the international sphere, with its decentralised system of governance, lack of a military pillar and its intergovernmental structure of decision making regarding Pillar 2, on foreign policy. The illusions that the EU was on a well-defined track to a stronger and unified foreign policy, mainly caused by the advancement of plans to create Rapid Reaction Forces and the military operations in Macedonia and Congo, were shattered by the Iraq war, which proved to be an epochal event for the EU's gradual and painstaking attempts to build up common foreign, security and defence policies. The divisive split between old and new Europe over Iraq has demonstrated that the Union not only lacks a clear position as to its policies in its nearest neighbourhood, but also has no common view of the bigger global issues in the presence of an aggressively unilateralist and militarist America.¹ While many were wondering whether the EU would be able to recover from the "knock out blow" caused by the split, it soon became evident that the shock has actually proved to be an unexpected catalyst for the Union to make progress in the field of foreign policy.

In March 2003, the European Commission published its policy communication on Wider Europe, which provides a number of proposals for defining a future partnership with Russia and enhanced relations with the Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean based on a long term approach promoting reform, sustainable development and trade.² The communication offers a wide range of policy implications, aiming to translate the rhetorical commitment of the Copenhagen European Council to enhance relations with neighbours on the basis of shared values, into practical measures through bilateral "Action Plans".

This Wider Europe initiative has been followed by the document on European security strategy submitted to the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 by Javier Solana. In the document titled, "A Secure Europe in a better World", Solana presents the new security threats as terrorism, organised crime and WMD proliferation, while highlighting that regional and international multilateralism is the key to legitimacy in a rule-based international order. He also argues for a more coherent and more capable Union that is able to "foster early, rapid

¹ Emerson, M. (2004) "The Wider Europe Matrix", Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, p.49.

²Western Newly Independent States (WNIS): Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus. Southern Mediterranean: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia.

and where necessary, robust intervention...involving both military and civilian capabilities".³ The European Parliament has also adopted a report in response to the Commission document, but with a much more systemic and comprehensive view of policies regarding Wider Europe.⁴

All these developments point to the fact that the Union, paradoxically with the help of the Iraqi crisis, has come to realise that in order to aspire to any effective foreign policy, it has to start with the wider European neighbourhood, by bringing the various instruments of European foreign policy and external relations together. As Wallace has highlighted, a common foreign and security policy that did not have at its core a coherent strategy towards the EU's immediate neighbours would be a contradiction in terms.⁵

EU's will for increased activism in its neighbourhood also has important consequences for its relations with Turkey. On the basis of the geographical scope of the Wider Europe initiative, it can be stated that Turkey's accession to the EU would specifically strengthen the EU's southern dimension and shift the internal political gravity centre further towards the south. Turkey's character as a secular democracy with an overwhelmingly Muslim population could serve as a model for the Third Countries of the Mediterranean (TCMs) whereas its improved economic relations with parts of the southern Mediterranean rim countries, the weight that it has gained within the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in the wake of the confrontations in the Balkans and its close alliance with Israel can provide the EU with the opportunity to be an important actor in the Southern Mediterranean/Middle Eastern region.⁶ For many Southern Mediterranean/Middle Eastern states, in particular Israel, the EU lacks the credibility and capability concerning its declared aim of playing a greater political role in Middle Eastern affairs with its insensitivity and detachment from the Middle Eastern reality. With the accession of Turkey, the EU would gain a greater deal of legitimacy in its involvement in Middle Eastern affairs as having extended into the region itself. This legitimacy could also prove instrumental in decreasing Israeli resistance to EU involvement in the region by building more constructive channels of communication via Turkey.⁷

However, such contributions of Turkey to the strengthening of EU foreign policy in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East depends upon whether the EU will decide to act in the region as a unified force with clear responsibilities or choose to abstain as a fragmented civilian power. The Wider Europe initiative, in this sense, is still pretty vague with serious omissions. Although Syria, Israel and Palestine- the countries included in the newly emerging concept of the "Greater Middle East"-are included in EU's new neighbourhood policy, the Union chose to say almost nothing on its future neighbours in the region, notably Iran and Iraq, which it will be bordering after the Turkish accession. The importance of Gulf energy supplies to Europe and the likelihood of a continuing cascade of consequences of US policy after the Iraq war are already pushing the EU to develop certain tangible policies in the whole

³ J.Solana, "Securing Europe in a Better World", document submitted to the European Council, Thessaloniki, 19-21 June 2003.

⁴ European Parliament, "Report on Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", Raporteur: Pasqualina Napolitano, Final, A5-0378/2003, 5 November 2003.

⁵ Wallace, W., "Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25", 2003, EPFU Working Paper 2003/3, p.15. www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/EuroFPunit.html

⁶ Schumacher, T. "Inside or Outside: Turkey, EU Membership and the Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", Paper presented at the Third Annual EU-Turkey Conference, Siena, Italy, 20-21 October 2003, p.8-9.

⁷ Sarto, R.A.D. "Turkey's EU Membership: An Asset for the EU's Policy towards the Mediterranean/Middle East", Paper presented at the Third Annual EU-Turkey Conference, Siena, Italy, 20-21 October 2003, p.7-16.

of the Middle East, stretching from Morocco to the Gulf.⁸ Within such a context, Turkish accession is bound to accelerate EU's shift from existing declaratory policies to a concrete presence in the region.

Another neighbouring region where EU policies could be very much intertwined with the Turkish presence is the Southern Caucasus. Although the Commission communication has declared that the region falls outside the geographical boundaries of the Wider Europe initiative, both the Solana paper and the Parliament Report have called for the region's inclusion. In case the EU would be more willing to take a more active stance in the Caucasus, especially with respect to the ongoing conflicts and the anchoring of democracy, Turkey could prove to be an asset, considering its already existing leverage in the region based on historical and cultural ties as well as its unavoidable geopolitical liabilities. By Turkey's membership, EU could contribute to the normalisation of Turkey-Armenian relations and thus create a more conducive environment to the resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

It would be unrealistic to assume that the Union, in its present state, would be capable of being engaged in global power projection. However, initiatives such as the Wider Europe scheme and recent signs of an agreement regarding structured cooperation in defence may optimistically be viewed as modest tools to resume the development of EU foreign policy after the Iraq war, on the road to becoming a more active global actor. According to some observers, should the EU wish to proceed along that line, Turkey as a "strategic medium state" could even help the Union gain the status of "challenger" vis-à-vis the hegemonic power, the USA.⁹ What one needs to be cautious of in this respect is that in case the EU sticks to its abstinence discourse or conducts very limited progress on this front, then Turkish accession with the introduction of the new neighbours could be perceived as too much of a challenge for the Union. It is specifically stated in the Wider Europe Communication of the Commission that the aim is to "strengthen the framework for the Union's relations with those neighbouring countries that do not currently have the perspective of membership of the EU" and that "it does not, therefore, apply to the Union's relations with the remaining candidate countries-Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria-or the Western Balkans".¹⁰ However, the Parliament report on the Wider Europe, after highlighting that "the launch of the Wider Europe-Neighbourhood Policy must have absolutely no effect on the candidate status of Bulgaria and Romania... and Turkey.., and the potential candidate status of the western Balkan countries" dedicates a specific clause to Turkey stating that "irrespective of the question of a possible future membership, Turkey should also be included in the Wider Europe-Neighbourhood Policy".¹¹ This, together with the fact that the new neighbours that will be introduced with Turkey's accession are left out of the Commission Communication signal that the option of finding a special status for Turkey, falling short of full membership are being kept open in Europe. Such an option however, is not solely linked to the future foreign policy orientations of the EU, but also to other related realms, that of institutional structure and identity, where the Union is again being engaged in an ongoing process of self-definition.

⁸ Emerson, M. "The Wider Europe Matrix", Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, p.32

⁹ See Oran, B. "The Meeting Point: Thoughts on a Potential Geostrategic Interaction between a 'Challenger' and a 'Strategic Medium State'", Paper presented at Turkey-EU Conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 6-7 November 2003, s. 79-85.

¹⁰ European Commission, "Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", COM (2003) 104 final, 11.3.2002, p.3

¹¹ European Parliament, "Report on Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", Rapporteur: Pasqualina Napolitano, Final, A5-0378/2003, 5 November 2003, p.8-9.

Convention and the New Institutional Structure

As the Wider Europe scheme is an attempt to define Europe with respect to its outer edges and neighbourhood, the Convention tries to define Europe from the inside, with respect to decision making mechanisms and institutional structures of the Union. The major driving force for the launching of the Convention has been the challenges that enlargement poses for the Union. As the intergovernmental method of decision making on crucial issues such as the improvement of EU's capacity to make decisions and the strengthening of EU's democratic character has reached its limits with the Nice Treaty, the EU leaders decided to convene a Convention in order to facilitate a broad and open debate on the future of Europe. The Draft Constitutional Treaty that was proposed to the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 as a good basis for starting the Intergovernmental Conference, clearly outlines the road the Union will have to travel in the decade to come and lay down the institutional basis required for that endeavour.

Despite the fact that negotiations over the Treaty provisions could not be concluded under the Italian Presidency and were handed over to the Irish Presidency which will reconvene the IGC in March, it is still possible to discern certain trends in the path that the future EU will be taking and the possible implications this has for the prospects of Turkey's accession. Turkey has usually been cited as a problematic candidate country with its large size, its high rates of population and especially according to those with federalist ambitions, its potential to present an obstacle in the further deepening of the Union. This concern is now further highlighted with the attempts to devise EU's future, especially with respect to the handling of classical cleavages between the federalists and inter-governmentalists as well as big states and small member countries. Thus, Verheugen's statement in September 2003, suggesting that structural changes are necessary within the EU if it were to accommodate such a large and populous country as Turkey, is no coincidence within this respect, as the issue of Turkish accession also falls in the middle of this debate.

If one moves on to analyse in which direction the EU is moving in terms of the federalist and the inter-governmentalist divide, it is observed that the balance between a purely intergovernmental and federal Europe has been preserved with the Convention. The European Council is being strengthened by being formalised as a European institution and by having a permanent president with a two and a half year term, replacing its rotating presidency. The Council of Ministers will be benefiting from the reinforcement of the coordinating role of the General Affairs Council and from the clearer distinction made between legislative and executive tasks. National parliaments are also being strengthened by receiving full information rights and a new "early warning" mechanism that provides them with direct access to the Union's legislative process.¹² To claim that these point to a shift in favour of the inter-governmental character of the Union would be misleading as the federalist aspirations are also partially satisfied with the strengthening of the European Parliament by the acceptance of the co-decision procedure as the standard legislative procedure of the Union and the reinforcement of the Commission's powers by the extension of its power of initiative, the general recognition of its driving role in the Union and the reduction of the size of the college. Although disagreements are still there between the inter-governmentalists and the federalists on issues such as the permanent presidency of the Council, the number of

¹² Crum, B. "Giscard puts the EU on track", CEPS Commentary, June 2003, www.ceps.be/Commentary/Jun03/Crum.php

Commissioners that will have voting rights in the Commission¹³ and the existence of the veto right in areas of taxation, immigration, foreign policy and culture, the IGC negotiation suggest that there will not be any drastic changes on these issues, with the possible exception of the number of Commissioners that will have voting rights in the Commission. Against this background, it is safe to assume that the emergence of European supranationalism in the near future is very low, which points to the fact that Turkish accession to the EU would not have a deeply transformative effect on the balances of power between the member states and the Union.

The same, however, does not hold true with respect to the power struggle between big and small states in the European Union. The most controversial issue within that respect concerns the new voting system in the Council, whereby qualified majority voting would now consist of a majority of countries representing 60 percent of Europe's population. This new voting system is expected to give the three biggest countries, namely Germany, France and the UK, the possibility to block any decision supported by the other 22 member states and thus considerably reduce the ability of the smaller countries to defend their interests. Spain and Poland in particular, with a view to keep the disproportionate power in Council decision-making granted to them by the Nice Treaty, oppose the new voting system. In case the proposed system gets through, it would also mean that Turkey, after accession, would have a big weight in the Council on the basis of its population. A recent study conducted by Richard Baldwin and Mika Widgren confirm this assumption by utilising a quantitative tool in voting theory called the 'Normalised Banzhaf Index' (NBI). NBI measures the likelihood of a nation to find itself in a position to 'break' a winning coalition on a randomly selected issue, thus signifying how powerful a country is likely to be on a randomly chosen issue. Their analysis suggests that after accession and under the rules proposed by the Draft Constitution, Turkey would have an NBI of 9.8%, ranking second after Germany that has an NBI of 10.1%. The power difference between Turkey and other big countries such the UK, France, Italy and Poland would also be much more accentuated compared to the Nice arrangement under which the power of all big and moderately big members are already lowered by the Turkish accession.¹⁴

The case of Turkey is already being used by the Spanish to legitimise their stance on the issue. In a news article, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ana Palacio drew attention to the weight that would be given to Turkey if the "60 percent of EU population rule" for Council decision making was accepted.¹⁵ Even the French, who officially support the German position on the proposed new voting system, have made comments on the possibility of a dominant Turco-German alliance that this system would present after the Turkish accession. Philippe de Villiers, French MEP has recently claimed that "the system proposed by the Convention will permit Germany to dominate Europe. This would be followed by a growth in Turkish influence, eventually surpassing that of Germany between 2015 and 2020".¹⁶

Trying to preserve the Nice system by appealing to the common fear of Turkish dominance in EU's major decision making body can be considered as representative of a significant obstacle on Turkey's accession, that of a balance of power in favour of the big states in the

¹³ The draft constitutional treaty proposes that only 15 commissioners should have voting rights, while other commissioners would be deprived of decision-making powers.

¹⁴ Baldwin, R. and Widgren, M. "The Draft Constitutional Treaty's Voting Reform Dilemma", CEPS Policy Brief No.44/November 2003, pp. 14-18

¹⁵ "Member States' divisions loom over IGC start on 4 October", 01.10.2003, www.euractiv.com

¹⁶ "France-the European Joker", 15.12.2003, www.euobserver.com

EU. The decision to set the number of MEPs of each member state in the Parliament on the basis of their population where the powers of EP are already being strengthened by the co-decision procedure is another arrangement where the small states consider being disadvantaged. This, again, has a tendency to aggravate the fear in European circles of Turkey's weight in yet another decision making body after accession, the European Parliament.

Although no final agreement has so far been reached on the most crucial topic of voting weights which was in fact the major cause behind the collapse of the talks under the Italian Presidency, the current debates show that this institutional self-definition, whichever way it turns out, is bound to have repercussions on the way the Union handles the issue of Turkish accession. The collapse of the talks have once more precipitated the debates over the launch of a "two-speed Europe" whereby a core group of member states integrate at a faster pace than the rest of the Union. The 'enhanced cooperation' clause of the Amsterdam Treaty was the first indication of such a possibility, later to be also included in the Nice Treaty. The agreement that has been reached in the negotiations on 'structured cooperation in defence' which suggests that countries can integrate more rapidly on defence issues so long as they fulfil certain capacity criteria also indicate the possibility for the emergence of a core on the basis of enhanced cooperation in defence policies alongside further cooperation in certain other policy areas such as justice and home affairs.

France and Germany have been the most outspoken countries in favour of a development towards a 'two-speed Europe', arguing that this is the only route for countries that prefer more integration. Despite the fact that the debate is now on the agenda of the EU than ever, thanks to the failure of negotiations, there is still tremendous ambiguity over how the core of such an EU would be defined and which countries would be taking part in it. Various scenarios are being discussed, ranging from a core of the founding six on the basis of identity to a core consisting mainly of France, Germany and the UK which would choose to enhance cooperation in certain policy fields. Whichever shape it takes form, the existence of a two-speed Europe would have a positive impact on the prospects of Turkish accession to the Union. It would lead to the emergence of a second-level, peripheral Europe characterised by relatively looser degrees of integration, where Turkey could well be situated in its years of adjustment to the dynamics of the Union. This could also make it easier for the Union to digest Turkey after accession. In case the core chooses to adopt a stronger stance on foreign policy in the future-which seems rather difficult, although not impossible with the UK- this could even lead to the eventual inclusion of Turkey into the core of the Union after the adjustment phase is over.

The institutional set up of the future EU is not the sole issue to remain unresolved in the IGC negotiations. Another matter that was discussed during the Convention and that seems to be overshadowed by the institutional debates even presents a bigger challenge for the EU, that of defining its identity upon which to establish its legitimacy.

Towards a Common European Identity?

Defining Europe involves significant problems as it is not a self-evident concept, meaning different things to different people. When one analyses certain objective criteria of collective identity formation such as geography, religion, language, common historical experience and common culture, one comes to terms with the significant constraints these factors pose in the creation of a common European identity in line with national identities.

In terms of geography, a major constraint is the fact that Europe lacks a clear eastern border. Another case of problematic boundaries also exist in the South as the Mediterranean forms a “unifying internal lake” rather than an “impermeable boundary”.¹⁷ Similar difficulties also apply in the definition of Europe with respect to religion. Although it seems as a common defining trait at first sight, exceptional cases exist with respect to Albania and Bosnia as well as the historical inter-Christian divides as that of Western Christendom and Eastern Orthodoxy. Another source of a common European identity may also be sought in a common history. There exist certain historical experiences shared by a vast majority of European states such as Christianity, Hellenism and the Roman tradition, feudalism, Renaissance, Reformation and the Enlightenment. However, the major problem with these historical experiences is that they have not all been experienced by the whole of Europe. The Roman Empire, for example, has never expanded to cover the whole of Europe, failing to reach Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. Scandinavia did not experience feudalism, Renaissance did not reach North and Eastern Europe where Reformation also remained constrained within the boundaries of Latin Christendom. Smith moves on to argue that Europeans do not only differ among themselves to an important extent in terms of territory, religion and history, but also in terms of law, economic and political system, ethnicity and culture; leading him to conclude that on the European level, one can only observe the emergence of a “family of cultures” made up of a syndrome of partially shared historical traditions and cultural heritages, rather than a firmly based common European identity paralleling the dominance of national identities.¹⁸

The lack of a common and relatively strong European identity did not pose an acute problem for the Community until towards the end of 1980’s and early 1990’s, the years which were marked by the dual move of Community integration and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The superseding importance of security considerations in the years of the Cold War over concerns regarding identity were also inherent in the way the Community welcomed Turkey’s application to the Community and has signed the Association Agreement of 1963, which was geared towards full membership. As the Union became more and more involved in shaping the lives of its citizens with its extending rules and policies without a corresponding move towards the formation of a European identity, the problem of democratic legitimacy occurred as a severe challenge to the Union and its future. The end of the cold war and the lifting of the superpower overlay also served to aggravate this legitimacy crisis and reached its peak with the close votes and rejections in the referenda of the Maastricht Treaty. This led the Union to undertake specific attempts to forge a European identity by various moves such as introducing direct elections to the Parliament and by making ever more frequent references to culture and religion as the roots of Europeanness.¹⁹

The enlargement policy of the EU was part and parcel of this process of identity construction. EU, in its relations with CEECs, placed a great emphasis on the common cultural heritage that is rooted in both East and the West, on the belonging of the CEECs to the “European family” and on the duty of the Union to unite these two parts of the same entity. This sense of kinship-based duty, however, was not just being used to legitimise the challenging process of enlargement at a rhetorical level, but in reality providing one of the main reasons of why the

¹⁷ Smith, A.D. (1992) “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity”, *International Affairs* 68(1) p.68

¹⁸ *ibid*, p. 70

¹⁹ See Lundgren, A. *Europeisk Identitetspolitik* PhD, University of Uppsala, 1998, for an in depth analysis of EU’s attempts to construct a European identity in early 1990’s with references to cultural and religious roots.

EU was enlarging.²⁰ It was thus no coincidence that first explicit remarks against Turkish membership on the bases of religion and identity were made at the critical Luxembourg Summit of 1997 where the enlargement process was splat into two phases, creating two waves of entry candidates, none of which included Turkey. The debates spurred by the Summit pointed that Turkey was not perceived as fitting in with the reunited and newly defined Europe established after the end of the Cold War and the eradication of its specific security concerns.

Against such background, Giscard d'Estaing's statements regarding Turkey as a country that would spell the end of the Union, with references also to culture and civilisation can be interpreted as a part of this ongoing process of identity construction on the part of the EU with its insiders and outsiders, as well as a reflection of the related concern to assure popular legitimacy for the integration process. The European Convention and the Draft Constitution are crucial stages in defining the future tenets of European identity which also has significant ramifications for its legitimacy. Turkey as the least wanted candidate to join the Union as demonstrated in Eurobarometer surveys, undoubtedly fuelled by factors such as the fear of large scale immigration and questions over its Europeanness, is not just perceived as a clear challenge for a coherent European identity needed for further legitimacy in the future EU, but also as a country that would be included against the public will, aggravating this problem of legitimacy from a different angle. The fact that Turkey's accession is expected to constitute one of the major cleavages in the 2004 elections to the European Parliament, as judged by the debates that have been rising all over Europe, is demonstrative of the sensitivity of the issue to a public otherwise characterised by a high degree of indifference to EU policies and elections.

The most concrete development that took place in the Convention with respect to politics of identity have been the calls from Poland, Spain, Italy and Ireland for a reference to Europe's Christian heritage in the preamble of the Constitution, which is a notion that the French categorically reject. As the IGC negotiations have not touched upon the issue so far, it remains to be seen whether such an exclusionary reference will be placed in the Constitution or not. In the case that it does, the EU would not only be denying its multi-religious essence, but would also be sending a clear message to Turkey as to its sincere views on Turkey's accession. In the case that it does not, this does not come to mean that debates over Turkey's Europeanness will cease to become an impediment on Turkey's path to Europe. A lot has to be discussed as to the defining traits of European identity not only at the level of the European Union, but also within member states themselves. Unless a new idea of Europe, which is able to provide an inclination for a "post-national European identity... based on a new politics of cultural and religious pluralism"²¹ is expressed, the logic of culture and identity, as it has done for centuries, will continue to colour the relations between the two.

Conclusion

This article aimed to demonstrate how the recent developments occurring in the European scene with respect to the Union's orientations in foreign policy, its new institutional set up and its never ending definitions and debates over the tenets of its identity can effect EU's relations with Turkey. Such an approach, by no means, aims to discredit studies that specifically focus on the obligations and problems of Turkey in the accession process and EU's policies towards Turkey. On the contrary, it tries to provide a complementary

²⁰ Sjursen, H. (2002) "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (3), pp. 491-513

²¹ Delanty, G. (1995) "*Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*", London, Macmillan Press, p.9

framework within which EU policies towards Turkey can best be understood and the possibilities for future forecasting can be enhanced.

The analysis has demonstrated that with respect to foreign policy, the choice between a more activist EU within the global sphere and a continuation of the traditional line of abstinence will have a high impact on its relations with Turkey. While Turkey would be perceived more as an asset in a more assertive and coherent EU foreign policy, the lack of coherence and the policy of indifference would present Turkey as too much of a challenge for the EU with the new boundaries that it will introduce. The divisive split at the Iraq war has pushed the EU to rethink its role in global politics, and although signs of recovery are there, it is still too early to be able to make optimistic predictions.

With respect to the new institutional set up, the cleavage between big and small states, rather than the divide between inter-governmentalists and the federalists seem to create the biggest challenge for Turkey. In case the voting systems in the Council and the Parliament, as proposed by the Convention, are retained; then the balance could turn in favour of big states; thus aggravating the fear of Turkey as a large and populous country. In the case that a 'two-speed Europe' is launched due to the disagreements over voting weights and the extension of qualified majority voting in taxation and social policy, this could be to the benefit of Turkey whose accession would be eased by the emergence of a periphery where it would be placed in the adjustment period after accession.

Regarding the issue of identity, Europe needs to get engaged in a more open debate as to the characteristics and the boundaries of "Europeanness". The degree of inclusiveness of such a self definition will prove crucial not just for EU's relations with Turkey, but also for the way member states deal with their own immigrant populations in a multi cultural and multi-religious Europe.

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