

POSSIBLE TRANSFORMATION OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ERA

Collective security is by nature a result of attempts to preserve the security of each and every state, which has come together against a common enemy/adversary. This concept will be analyzed in relation to the role of identity-building in the formation of collective security arrangements. Coercion has been one of the indispensable stimulants in state building. It is evident that anything, which is gained with coercion, is exposed to threat and thus to implicit vulnerability, as it is not achieved with the free will cooperation of others. Corollary to this logic, it can be said that as states are the product of coercion, they are exposed to threats against their security. Naturally, the essential minimum activities of a state have also been related to the use of coercion. Of these essential activities, war making and protection are directly related to coercion. One can therefore readily understand that security has always been a matter of critical importance for states since their existence is coercion-based. It is also evident that in this course of coercion-based international affairs, states resorted also to collective security efforts in various forms ranging from collations to even pacts and alliances that would in turn help their own security.

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INTRODUCTION

This essay focuses on the concept of collective security with a view to shedding some light on the possible transformation of current collective security arrangements, i.e. “the post-September 11 era”. It, by no means, intends to be exhaustive as to the analysis of all related theories as well as the academic literature on the topic. It rather aims to provide food for thought on the subject.

Collective security is by nature a result of attempts to preserve the security of each and every state, which has come together against a common enemy/adversary. This concept will be analyzed in relation to the role of identity-building in the formation of collective security arrangements. In the study, the following argumentation will be utilized.

Coercion has been one of the indispensable stimulants in state building. In fact, states are defined as “coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories”.² It is evident that anything, which is gained with coercion, is exposed to threat and thus to implicit vulnerability, as it is not achieved with the free will cooperation of others. Corollary to this logic, it can be said that as states are the product of coercion, they are exposed to threats against their security. Naturally, the essential minimum activities of a state have also been related to the use of coercion. Of these essential activities, war making and protection are directly related to coercion.³

This shows the importance of wars in the history of states. It is even argued that state structures appeared chiefly as a by-product of rulers' efforts to acquire the means of war that affect the entire process of state formation.⁴ On the other hand, the other state activity of essential nature, ‘protection’ is related to “attacking and checking rivals of the rulers' principal

² C. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992*, (Cambridge: Blackwell Pub., 1992), p.1.

³ *Ibid.*, p.96.

⁴ C. Tilly, ‘Reflections on the History of European State-Making’, in Tilly, C., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp.3-84.

allies, whether inside or outside the state's claimed territory".⁵ In light of these observations, one can readily understand that security has always been a matter of critical importance for states since their existence is coercion-based. It is also evident that in this course of coercion-based international affairs, states resorted also to collective security efforts in various forms ranging from collations to even pacts and alliances that would in turn help their own security.

IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY FOR STATES

Security is indispensable for states as they need to protect themselves from threats. Security is primarily an issue of a nation's relations with other states or a group of states. This relationship among states which feel threatened by each other is exposed to the security dilemma.⁶ It is generally argued that the security of nations cannot be defined in general terms, nor can it be determined objectively.⁷ Definitions depend on states' perception about threats and safety. Therefore, "on security no precise definition has ever been achieved and probably never will be".⁸ "There appears to be almost a studied vagueness about the precise definition of terms such as security".⁹

This complexity is also related to the problem of which areas of life are the subject of security. In this regard, theoretical debate occurs between two views of security studies, i.e., the "narrow" versus "wide" debate. For the followers of the narrow approach to security, the traditionalists, it is argued that identifying security issues is easy as they equate security with military issues and the use of force.¹⁰ Traditionalists also strongly oppose the widening of security studies, as by such logic, issues like pollution, disease, child abuse or economic

⁵ Tilly, op.cit., in note 1, p.96.

⁶ The security dilemma refers to the notion that a state's efforts to increase its security by threatening another state, which then responds with steps to increase its own security, paradoxically erodes the first state's security. See C. A. Kupchan, 'The Case for Collective Security', in Downs, G.W. (ed), *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, (USA: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp.41-69.

⁷ A.V. Geusau, *The Security of Western Europe*, (London: Sherwood Press, 1985), p.2.

⁸ C.Thune, "Problems of Transition" in J.Alford et al, *Europe in Western Alliance*, (London: MacMillan Press, 1988), p.87.

⁹ G.Edwards and B.Burrows, *The Defence of Western Europe*, (Norfolk: Butterworths, 1982), p.91.

¹⁰ B. Buzan et al, *Security, A New Framework for Analysis*, (London: Lynee Rienner Pub. 1998), p.3.

recessions could be viewed as threats to security. Here we see that the traditionalist view regards only military and political subjects as the focus of studies in the security field.

Yet, this approach has entered an impasse and led to increasing dissatisfaction in explaining the events taking place in the international arena later on. As pointed out by one of the proponents of the wider approach, this dissatisfaction was stimulated first by the rise of the economic and environmental agendas in international relations during the 1970s and the 1980s and later by the rise of concerns with identity issues and transnational crime during the 1990s.¹¹ Today it is obvious that this narrow definition does not fully cover the parameters of the new security environment in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, the political and intellectual climate has changed. Studies in this regard have articulated very different views about how to define the concept of security.

The narrow definition of security tends to focus on material capabilities and the use of military force by states. This, however, contrasts with the distinctions among military, political, economic, social, and environmental security threats.¹² Thus, with this transforming understanding of what security means today, the advocates of the wider approach concentrate on discussing the dynamics of security in five sectors, that is, military, political, economic, environmental and societal.¹³ This methodological framework also seems to better serve distinguishing security issues as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’.¹⁴

Faced with such a complexity, it is evident that disagreements on the definition of security are probably unavoidable due to the different analytical perspectives on the issue. Yet, in view of the presence of security risks of different natures, it is, at least from the practical point of view, a fact that security at present should be regarded as not merely, or even mainly, a matter

¹¹ Ibid., p.2.

¹² P.J. Katzenstein (ed), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.8-9.

¹³ See the introduction in Buzan, op.cit., pp.1-21.

¹⁴ Generally speaking, security issues requiring military options and relating to defense are considered ‘hard’ ones whereas others that require non-military measures such as conflict prevention are regarded as ‘soft’. But this distinction today appears to be less relevant in view of events and experience in world affairs. See for details M.T. Klare and D.C. Thomas (ed), *World Security*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).

of military policy, but of broader economic and political policies. For threats to security are not necessarily of a military nature, but they might derive from various other reasons.

In view of the above, one can draw two main conclusions. Irrespective of which subjects are to be considered in dealing with the security concept, it seems evident that security is about preservation of the existence of states. And, in this preservation effort, the military component is always present even if as a last resort. Similarly, threat perception and the nature of such perceived threats are important in determining whether and how the perceived threat should be viewed as a matter of security. Here, one can see that any phenomenon can become an issue of security when they are “securitised”.¹⁵ Thus, it is evident that the meaning of a concept lies in its usage and is not something, which can be defined analytically or philosophically.¹⁶

IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF IDENTITY-BUILDING

History shows that “security, whether defined narrowly or widely, is a scarce commodity”.¹⁷ Therefore, it is generally acknowledged that in face of security threat perceptions, states feel forced to combine their efforts to strengthen their own security.

This brings us to the concept of collective security. Here, similar to the conceptual problem in defining security, a precise definition of collective security remains elusive. Not only do definitions differ, which is bound to happen in public debate and scholarly discourse, but also some directly contradict each other.¹⁸

In simple terms, collective security is related to efforts by a group of states to act together in order to better preserve their own security. The term has been used to describe everything from loose alliance systems to any period of history in which wars do not take place. This wide

¹⁵ Securitization, in the words of Buzan, means a process by which “the issue in question is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bonds of political procedure”. See Buzan, op.cit., pp.23-24.

¹⁶ Ibid., p.24.

¹⁷ J.C. Garnett, “Introduction: Conflict and Security in the new world order”, in M.J. Davis, (ed), *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War*, (UK: Edward Elgar Pub.Ltd, 1996), p.10.

¹⁸ G.W. Downs, ‘Beyond the Debate on Collective Security’, in Downs, G.W. (ed), *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, (USA: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp.1-17.

spectrum is also due to the nature of security threats. States ally to increase their security against perceived threats.¹⁹

In any particular balance of power system, there are usually groups of states that share to some extent an assessment of those threats. States face two kinds of threats in general.²⁰ The first is usually the reason for which states join their forces in the first place, i.e. an external threat from a potential aggressor who is not part of the group. The second threat is of a more insidious but often just as dangerous nature, namely, an internal threat from a member of the group itself that betrays its friends and uses force against them. The first form of collective security is best illustrated by the alliance system. An alliance functions as a collective body that defends its members from security threats directed from outside. Thus it includes the concept of collective defense as well. Moreover, although an alliance is focused on external threats, the security is collective for its members. On the other hand, the best illustration of security arrangements countering internal threats coming from members of a collective security body is the "security community".²¹

Collective security rests on the notion of one for all and all for one. Here, the question of why states come together for collective security can be argued is clear enough. It is because they share the same threat perceptions against which they think they will be better-off if they act together. Yet, the question of how they perceive the same threat is not that clear. This brings us to the issue of identity-building.

Identification is considered a social concept.²² The process of identity formation is of a kind that develops within a social unit. "Any identification requires a distinction just as any

¹⁹ See K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading: Addison & Wesley, 1979) and also S. Walt, *The Origins of Alliance*, (Ithaca: Cornell, 1987)

²⁰ See for details S. Weber, 'Does NATO have a future?', in Crawford, B. (ed), *The Future of European Security*, (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1992), pp.360-395.

²¹ This concept was first introduced by Van Wageningen, and later in 1957 developed by Karl Deutsch with theoretical arguments. For the views of Deutsch, see particularly E. Adler, 'Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community', and P.W. Schultze, 'Competing for European Security: The CSCE, NATO and the European Community in a Changing International Environment', both in Crawford, B. (ed), *The Future of European Security*, (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1992).

²² A. N. Yurdusev, "Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği" in Atilla Eralp (ed) *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1997) p.18.

distinction necessitates some identification”²³. This brings us to the self/other dichotomy. The self is identified in relation to its position vis-à-vis the other²⁴. In other words, all identities exist only with their otherness. “Without the other, the self actually cannot know either itself or the world because meaning is created in discourse where consciousness meets”²⁵.

Identification is of an exclusionary nature for the non-identified. In other words, in the identification of a group of people as a community, this unit is externalized of or disassociated from the values, myths, symbols, attitudes and mores of those (non-identified) with whom the unit does not identify itself.²⁶

It is also argued that the existence or the perception of threats from the other inevitably strengthens the identity of the self.²⁷ The formation of the self is inextricably intertwined with the formation of its others and a failure to regard the others in their own right must necessarily have repercussions for the formation of the self.²⁸

Identity is the key element of a cognitive region. Shared self-definitions create internalized norms that allow people from different countries to know each other better and thus respond more effectively to the common concerns.

What constitutes the basis for collective security arrangements is therefore the mutual responsiveness developed out of answers to the questions of “who I am” and “who the other is”. In other words, it is the collective identity, which lays the ground for a sound collective security.

The importance of identities can thus be summarized as follows: common identities help to establish a security whose existence, i.e. collective security, proves that members share common identities.

²³ A.N. Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: a Civilizational Approach*, (London: MacMillan, forthcoming), p.105.

²⁴ K. Krause, “Critical Theory and Security Studies”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol (33)3, 1998, p.312..

²⁵ I.B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other*, (UK: Manchester University Press, 1999), P.13.

²⁶ Yurdusev, *op.cit.*, in note 22, p.107.

²⁷ Yurdusev, , *op.cit.*, in note 21, p.21.

²⁸ Neuman, *op.cit.*, p.35.

In view of the foregoing, one can easily understand that collective identities and shared values as well as shared understandings as regards threat perceptions are of significant importance for the creation of a workable collective security arrangement.

The identity issue entered into International Relations full fledged with the critical theories, such as “constructivism”. However, “mainstream” approaches ²⁹also acknowledge identity. But, how it differs from the constructivist approach is that it presumes to know apriori what the self-being is defined as. The state as a unit is assumed to have a single identity, across time and space whereas constructivism assumes that the selves, or identities, of states are variable, they likely depend on historical, cultural, political and social context³⁰.

Accordingly, as regards the object of security, the constructivist approach questions how the object of security is constructed according to threat perceptions. Here, the argument that discourses of threat are constitutive of the object to be secured relates to the question of how such threats are identified.

In view of the foregoing, one can see that constructivism helps better explain collective security formations that are constitutive of collective identities. Thus, sound collective security arrangements are forms of collective identity that exclude each other on the basis of their distinctiveness.

Throughout history, powerful countries have constructed three versions of collective security arrangements at the global level. All these regimes, the Concert of Europe, the League

²⁹ By “mainstream scholarship”, the paper refers to theoretical approaches that have dominated international relations since the Cold War, i.e. (neo) realists, liberalists (neoliberalists institutionalism), which work on the basis of positivist/rationalist parameters. See for details, K. Krause, “Critical Theory and Security Studies”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 1998, Vol.33(3), pp.298-333, and also J. Fearon and A. Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism”, in W. Carlsnaes (et al) *Handbook of International Relations*, (London: Sage Pub.ltd, 2002), pp. 52-73.

³⁰ T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, *International Security*, Vol 23(1), Summer 1998, p.176.

of Nations and the United Nations, reject unrestrained power balancing through competitive alliances that characterize laissez-faire approaches to security.³¹

Yet, they have all failed to provide for an efficient collective security arrangement to diffuse war and conflict.³² Although in the case of the UN, one can argue that it has helped prevent world wars since the second World War, the reason for the absence of such a global war is in fact not the UN but the balance of terror based on mutual nuclear deterrence that the two opposing military blocs pose. Here, one can ask why they failed to form an efficient collective security arrangement at the global level?

This can be explained with reference to identity issues in view of the previous discussions on the importance of identity-building for the creation of collective security arrangements. Here, it can be argued that those security regimes could not establish a collective identity against a common threat. In other words, the selves in these organizations did not come together against a common “other”. In the Cold War era, the “other” was the East for the West and vice versa, although members of both Blocs remained in the same global security regime, the UN. Therefore, their stay in the UN was not due to the creation of a common identity but due to a felt need.

IMPACT OF THE POST-COLD WAR

The post-Cold War has had a considerable impact on this state of affairs. The end of the Cold War, which for almost half a century had been the symbol of division in Europe, was marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall on October 3rd 1989. The fall of the Berlin wall meant also the collapse of the ideological walls which had divided Europe for so many years.

The end of the Cold War even raised questions regarding the necessity of NATO as military alliances normally dissolve once their common enemy has been defeated. However, ,

³¹ See for details, particularly A. Bennet, and J. Lepgold, “Reinventing Collective Security After the Cold War”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 18, Issue 2, 1993.

³² Ibid.

with the rise of non-conventional and asymmetric security threats this was proven not to be the case³³.

These threats to international security are not totally new phenomena. However, what is new in this sense is the effect of globalisation on these threats. Today, in a world where things have increasingly become more transnational and interdependent, owing to the effects of globalisation, any incident in a country or in region, be it a terrorist act or an ethnic conflict, poses threats to other areas due to the domino effect. As a corollary to this, threats that transcend borders happen to affect security more rapidly, more severely in an ever-expanding magnitude with spill-over effects. These threats inevitably necessitate collective responses as they affect almost all states in one way or another.

In such an environment, Europe in particular and the world in general have witnessed several hot conflicts and wars in just one decade in the post-Cold War era, which amounts to more than occurred in the whole course of the Cold War years. The European continent, which had been free from wars since the end of World War II, once again became a continent of conflict and death with a wars that erupted in its very midst, like in the territories of the former Yugoslavia or in its vicinity, or like the Caucasus or elsewhere like in the Middle East, i.e. the Gulf war.

In view of this, one can argue that the basic premises of mainstream scholarship, such as anarchical setting, power politics based on national interests, etc., are still present in the world affairs. True, mainstream scholarship failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War. But, the world order, which has replaced the Cold War era, still proves the validity of mainstream scholarship. States act in pursuit of preservation of their interests and of protection of their

³³ Asymmetric threat is defined as a threat that can cause harm in bigger magnitude than its size. Such threats vary from international terrorism, ethnic conflicts and religious fundamentalism through organized crime, drug trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to mass migrations, environmental disasters, poverty etc. See Erkem, S., "11 Eylül 2001: Terrorizmin Yeni Miladi", *Stratejik Analiz*, Sayı 18, Ekim 2001. Asymmetric threat is also defined as a threat that does not follow the rules of fair warfare including surprise attacks, as well as warfare with weapons used in an unconventional manner. See www.rand.org/news/links/terrorism.ntml.

security in the face of both conventional and non-conventional security threats. However, the main question here is how they gather support from other states for such policies and how legitimacy is attained for them. In fact, the transboundary effects of such security threats help states gather the support of like-minded states and act collectively to protect their security against such threats.

Collective security arrangements have been seriously proposed after every large-scale war, such as the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II. The end of the Cold War followed the same path both in academic and state circles. In this regard, naturally the UN, being the only global organisation for collective security, has been called upon several times.

In the post-Cold War era, the UN Security Council has adopted a series of resolutions availing itself of the right to humanitarian intervention. That self-empowerment has followed a gradual but uneasy process through a number of experiences as witnessed in various wars and fights such as that of the Gulf, Bosnia and Somalia.³⁴

Despite this gradual progress in fulfilling its task of collective security, the UN faced a deadlock during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Due to Russia and China's objection to a military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the UN could not reach a decision authorising the formation of a military force with the Security Council mandate and this implicitly left it up to NATO to take the responsibility .

In light of these one can see that even in the post-Cold War era the UN system has maintained the inertia it derives from its organisational set-up. This can be attributed to the following: In the post-Cold War era, although one of the Blocs disappeared, it was evident that at least the old leader of the East , i.e. Russia on the one hand and the USA together with the rest of the Western Bloc on the other, continued to regard each other as "other". This was because they have not been able create a collective identity (self), as they could not define a common threat (other) either.

³⁴ See for details C. Guicherd, "International Law and the War in Kosovo", *Survival*, , Volume 41, No: 2, Summer 1999.

POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ERA

The world that embarked on a new millennium with these important shifts in international affairs in general and in the collective security field in particular, was unable to avoid the tragedy of September 11th. The terrorist attacks of September 11 have changed many, if not all, parameters in world affairs, and has important repercussions for security in a variety of ways and the approach to collective security is no exception to this.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks, NATO allies lined up behind the US and in an unprecedented display of support and solidarity they invoked, on 12 September 2001, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of the Alliance, the core clause of collective defense, for the first time in the history of the Alliance.³⁵

This decision seems to have constituted a dramatic shift in the conceptualization of what forms hard and soft security issues. First, it was bitterly confirmed that terrorism is one of the most dangerous non-conventional asymmetric security threats. Similarly, it was also confirmed that terrorists can easily access weapons of mass destruction. More importantly, with the invocation of Article 5 and the military operation directed against the al-Qaida terrorist network and its sanctuary the Taleban regime, it has become clear that the fight against terrorism, which was always regarded as a matter of soft security, would also require hard security measures, including military ones, in the post-September 11 era.

In this context, one can argue that the September 11 terrorist attacks have provided a conducive atmosphere for the creation of a new “other”, i.e. common enemy. This was “terrorism”³⁶. In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks the international community has apparently realised that terrorism, as a global phenomenon, must be combated in a spirit of

³⁵ See NATO Press Release on 12 September 2001, www.nato.int.

³⁶ Although there is yet no one common definition about terrorism and its forms, at least as a phenomenon it is condemned by all states. The nature and content of terrorism indeed is subject to a separate study which lies beyond the scope of this paper.

solidarity. Heads of states, prime ministers and ministers at many levels, have expressed and reaffirmed their determination to play their part in a co-ordinated manner in the coalition against terrorism under the aegis of the United Nations.

Thus, in the post-September 11th era, almost all states seem to have found a new "other", terrorism, against which they are still identifying themselves. Particularly, at the summit meetings that took place in 2002 between the Russian Federation and the USA, NATO, and the EU respectively, this new approach has been clearly underlined by stating that terrorism is their common enemy. It can, therefore, be argued that states at present gradually come together and develop a common collective identity in opposition to a commonly perceived security threat, the "other". This is terrorism in particular and other non-conventional security threats of asymmetric nature such as WMDs (weapons of mass destruction), religious fundamentalism and extreme nationalism, which are either the root cause or the means of terrorism.

The presence of such a "common enemy" which has been already condemned by almost all UN member states, no doubt constitutes an important opportunity to facilitate the creation of a workable collective security arrangement at the global level in the future. Continuing efforts within the UN framework, which were launched with UNSC resolution 1378 underscoring among other things that the terrorist acts committed on September 11th 2001 posed a threat to international peace and security and in this context reaffirms the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter, albeit falling short of providing a clear definition terrorism, have yet brought about significant norms in the fight against terrorism.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This essay has attempted, in view of the argumentation developed in the preceding sections, to suggest in brief the following: States as coercion-wielding units are inherently vulnerable to outside threats, and thus in dire need of security measures. This state of affairs also necessitates collective security arrangements for better preservation of their own security,

and collective security arrangements can be better utilized against an identified common enemy/adversary.

The main argument is that the identity of each unit, i.e. state, is shaped in relation to its opposition vis-à-vis those of others. In other words, the dichotomy of the self/other is relevant in the identification process as all identities exist only within the otherness relationship. In view of this understanding, it is argued that collective security is based on the formation of a common identity of like-minded states (selves) in opposition to a commonly perceived enemy (other).

All this argumentation clearly reflects the relevance of the constructivist scholarship in the developments towards a new collective identity of states to better provide collective security. The central issue in the post-Cold War era is how different groups conceive their identities and interests. In the absence of constructivist explanation of identity-formation, it would be hard to contemplate the present issues in the field of security studies in general and collective security in particular.

In this context, the post- September 11th era seems to be conducive for debates on the viability of workable collective security arrangements. This is particularly true because today states tend to come together and thus form a collective identity at the global level against a commonly perceived security threat, i.e. terrorism, and its use of weapons of mass destruction. In other words, states perceiving common threats construct collective identities against a commonly perceived/identified enemy, which in turn help overcome the security dilemma. Collective identities of the members of a collective security arrangement against a commonly perceived enemy/ security threat are essential for the existence of such an arrangement.

Perhaps, this is the first time all members of the international community and particularly the Russian Federation, and the USA, i.e. “selves”, seem to have established a collective identity against the common enemy of terrorism, i.e. “the other”. Terrorism is increasingly used as a legitimizing factor in the eyes of the international community as well as in international law for military operations against a non-state group or another state.

For instance, in pursuance of their policies for toppling the Saddam regime, the US administration has undertaken a campaign aiming to convince the international community that Iraq not only possesses WMD but more importantly provides them for international terrorism.³⁷ This is because terrorism is condemned by all as the “*other*”.

To conclude, one can assert that terrorism emerges as the common threat, against which the international community seems to have built its own collective identity. The present momentum in the UN as regards various works and studies concerning the fight against terrorism is promising in this regard despite its institutional inertia deriving from veto rights. However, it is also certain that the onus of proof for the possible transformation of the present regime in the UN into an “ideal” collective security arrangement to face such common threats, will rest with the strength of this conceptual shift - recognition of terrorism as “other”- in the minds of states (selves) in the future.

³⁷ To date, the USA has not been able to provide any convincing evidence of Iraq’s material support for international terrorism let alone prove the presence of any WMD in this country. However, the author of this essay opines that had the ties of the Iraqi regime with terrorism been proven, the military operation of the USA and the UK without a legitimate UN mandate would have been less criticized by the international community, and that this would have even facilitated overcoming the veto threats of the rest of the permanent members of the UNSC.

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