

From the Desk of the Editor

This issue of Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ) focuses on the rapid and fundamental change in the strategic map of the Middle East. In addition to examining the rise of people power and geopolitical shifts in the region, we look at energy security dynamics, Turkey's foreign policy priorities and its ever-evolving relations within the Euro-Atlantic alliance. The arc of NATO's role in the region, topical developments of the "Arab uprisings," and questioning whether the "rest" can be empowered without threatening the West form this volume's content.

In an exclusive interview with TPQ, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen assesses the Alliance's stance on the Libya operation and the crisis in Syria, while providing an overview of major developments in the region over the past couple of years. The Secretary General notes NATO's recent decision to enhance cooperation with its non-member partners. He also points out that NATO's door is open to the membership of all European democracies that share the Alliance's values, can assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and will contribute to common security and stability. The Secretary General underlines that Turkey's contributions to Euro-Atlantic security and the benefits it derives from cohesion among the Allies remains important.

NATO's favorability in Turkey has dropped in recent years. In the period between 2008 and 2011 when the Ankara leadership was fostering closer relations with neighbors including Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus, NATO's value for Turkey's security appeared to be downplayed in the public debate. The decline of NATO's popularity in Turkey is surely also a casualty of the sense of exclusion from the EU among Turkish nationals.

The impasse of Turkey's EU accession process and Ankara's frictions within NATO have strained Turkey's image among various Allies. Ankara wrangled over the participation of the EU in the NATO Chicago summit of May 2012, and continues to block cooperative action with NATO partners in order to prevent Israel's inclusion. While Turkey has also been faulted for preventing NATO-EU collaboration, the root cause of this situation is EU decision-making *vis-à-vis* Cyprus. As TPQ authors have pointed out, EU foreign policy institutions could have been designed in a way that did not exclude Turkey – such as enabling non-EU European Allies to participate in EU-only operations through Council invitation to be decided by simple majority instead of unanimity, or enabling their involvement in the European Defense Agency by simple majority voting. Clearly, more active participation by

Turkey in European security and defense affairs would benefit all sides. However, it is unclear whether Turkey's "hardball" makes Western partners more aware of Turkey's indispensability or risks isolating the country.

Whether the EU can overcome its internal economic and governance-related challenges, how EU institutions are reconfigured, and the evolution of the European External Action Service (EEAS) will take years to settle. Developments in those areas will have decisive implications for Turkey's integration in European strategic affairs, as well as its EU accession prospects.

The change of leadership in France, an important relationship for Turkey's accession process, has been met with optimism. The previous French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, had blocked five chapters of the *acquis* from being opened for Turkey in 2007 due to Turkey "not being part of Europe." The exclusion of Turkey on grounds of "civilizational" differences has fueled resentment in Turkey and removed the leverage of conditionality that the EU would otherwise have. We are therefore particularly excited that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Laurent Fabius, agreed to share his vision of "new horizons" for the relationship with TPQ readers.

In advance of the first state visit to Turkey by a French president in 20 years, the foreign minister emphasizes the long-running economic and cultural ties between the two countries and underlines the "interlinked" nature of the future of the two nations. The growing common interests of Turkey and France in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa, the Caucasus and the Balkans are also discussed by the foreign minister. Fabius points out that both countries have provided support for "the legitimate aspirations of the Arab peoples" and their development of "democratic, pluralistic institutions." He also underlines that Paris and Ankara are among the most active countries in the "Group of Friends of the Syrian People" in "seeking a resolution to the Syrian conflict, increasing the pressure on Bashar al-Assad's regime for him to stand down, and working for a more united opposition."

Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu, head of the Department of International Relations of Okan University, traces Ankara's "zero problems with neighbors" doctrine from its positive inception until its failings in face of regional upheaval. He explains that foreign minister Davutoğlu's doctrine was bound to fail unless similar intentions had been shared by the respective neighbors themselves. Zooming into Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Russia, he points out how their interests were diametrically opposed to Ankara's, as the Arab Spring culminated in Syria's turmoil. He also argues that Turkey's foreign and prime ministers should have known that Syria would get

bogged down in domestic turmoil and that Turkey would not be able to pursue its interests due to the leverage Iran and Russia exerted on Syria combined with the lack of “balancing” by Israel and the U.S.

Particularly since 2008, Ankara has appeared to be driven by the conviction that Turkey could strengthen its regional standing with a tough stance against Israel. Today, at odds with Iran and Syria, some in Turkey are questioning this calculation, particularly in light of the U.S. and Israel’s reluctance to support Syrian rebels against the Assad regime.

Ankara’s policy shifts between Western partners and neighbors are analyzed by Junior Research Scholar at the Greece-based Strategy International and Ph.D. candidate Zenonas Tziarras, in his article examining “Turkey’s Syria problem.” Tziarras differentiates Turkey’s position throughout the stages of escalation in the Syria crisis, noting that until the summer of 2011, Ankara was reluctant to take a stand against the Assad regime, then sided with Western allies against Assad, and now is again trying to work out a solution with regional powers such as Iran and Russia. Tziarras concludes that there has been a gap between the aspirations and capabilities of Turkish foreign policy.

Since the articles for this issue of TPQ were compiled, certain critical developments have taken place.

One was the breakout of Israeli military action against Gaza, with the stated goal of ending the rocket attacks from inside the city. The fact that President Obama “justified” Israel’s actions as self-defense against missile attacks from the Gaza strip was received quite negatively by the Turkish leadership. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s vocal counter-stance marked a rift between the Ankara and Washington administrations, which have been aligned –at least publicly– throughout the Arab uprisings. It has also attracted attention that Cairo, rather than Ankara, was in the forefront of recent efforts to bring about a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel.

Significant developments also took place on the front of Syria. Turkey has requested the deployment of NATO Patriot missiles near Turkey’s border with Syria in case of attacks from Assad forces – igniting harsh reactions from Moscow. Meanwhile, a new Syrian opposition coalition, the Syrian National Coalition, was formed with U.S. backing in November 2012 – as the Syrian National Council was not deemed inclusive, effective, or united enough, and showed signs of radicalization. Given the Syrian National Council’s close ties to Ankara, this has been interpreted as a sign of the limits of Turkish influence.

The perception of Ankara getting drawn into regional sectarian divides rather than standing up for pluralism has weakened Turkey's hand in certain cases. While the consistent hardline anti-Israel and anti-Assad stance of the Turkish Prime Minister is popular among Sunni Muslims in Turkey and the region, it has reduced Ankara's part in the search for solutions in some cases, and has even exacerbated polarization in others.

The relationship between Turkey and the United States is a crucial dimension of many of the topics covered in this issue of TPQ. Senator John McCain in his contribution to this issue of TPQ, notes that Turkey is changing, and the nature of the Turkey-U.S. alliance is also changing accordingly. His overarching message is that if the two sides remain guided by a few core principles, the alliance can be transformed into a broader, deeper, more durable, and more relevant relationship.

Laura Batalla Adam, a Turkey analyst working at the European Parliament, takes up the question of whether the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has been shifting Turkey's foreign policy axis. She points out that the "Cyprus Problem" has been the most significant reason why Turkey's accession to the EU is not feasible in the near future and explains that this reality has led Turkey to look for new *venues* to increase its power. She argues, however, that Ankara should "simultaneously look to the East and the West in its search for its identity and its place on the world stage." Turkey's influence in neighboring regions and its relations with the EU are intricately related to its domestic politics and image abroad. Progress in Turkey on delivering citizens more freedoms, rights and liberties will be central both for Turkey's regional role and its place in the European Union. Democratization is also a central issue for security in Turkey.

Aykan Erdemir, a Republican People's Party (CHP) member of the Turkish parliament, explains how decades of securitized Turkish policy discourse created the perception of existential threats and stifled critical debate, eventually giving rise to the AKP. The AKP's promise to revise the securitized paradigm resonated positively among a large segment of the electorate, as well as in the international political scene. However, after a decade of single party rule, the AKP has failed to fulfill its promise of de-securitization, he argues, pointing out the ongoing rise of authoritarianism reflected in restrictions on political liberties, freedom of expression, and the media.

Erdemir also contends that the new leadership that rose to power in CHP in 2010 has enabled a turn from state-centric approaches to a human security perspective within the party. According to the author, young scholars have been mobilized to articulate approaches more in line with the global social democracy scene. Erdemir,

who is also member of the Scientific Board of the Social Democracy Association, argues that a critical determinant of whether the CHP can be successful in the run up of the 2014 local elections and shape Turkey's national, regional, and global policies will depend on whether young voices are incorporated successfully in the party organization.

Gabriel Mitchell, a research fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem, also focuses on AKP's inability to meet the expectations it had created regarding overcoming domestic challenges. Mitchell focuses on the "Kurdish Problem", arguing that once it consolidated power, AKP backed out of its commitments to fringe and minority political groups and prioritized the interests and values of its primary constituents – the nationalist, Sunni Muslim conservatives. Pointing to the rise in PKK terror acts, Mitchell makes the controversial assertion that negotiations with the PKK may be the only way for the Turkish government to ensure Turkey's current borders are maintained. Though this is not the first time such a suggestion is voiced, it is not a view that is widely accepted in Turkey. Mitchell also makes less controversial suggestions, such as that the new Turkish constitution should rearticulate the identity of the country's citizens taking into account the demands of the Kurdish constituents, and the government should make more of an effort for the development of Southeast Anatolia.

We also focus on the Black Sea region in this issue of TPQ, including views from the region about NATO, perspectives on democratization and conflict resolution, and scrutiny of developments related to energy security.

Iulian Chifu, founding president of the Center for Conflict prevention and Early Warning in Bucharest writes about "European Defense in the Age of Austerity." Chifu focuses on the development of a "smart defense" concept and new missile defense capabilities after the May 2012 NATO Summit that took place in Chicago. Chifu, who is also an advisor for Strategic Affairs and International Security to the President of Romania, expresses concern about the transfer of military equipment to countries that regard NATO as their enemy and that have demonstrated tendencies to create unrest in their neighborhood. In this context, he suggests, some dimensions of NATO-Russia exchanges challenge the notion of solidarity within NATO.

A relevant recent development in this neighborhood is the October 2012 parliamentary election in Georgia. While the election process marked democratic success, questions have been raised about how Tbilisi will conduct its relations with Turkey, Russia, and the Euro-Atlantic at large in moving forward.

Andrea Filetti, a PhD. candidate at the *Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane* (SUM) in Florence, uses related theory in seeking the answer to why some countries are

shielded from popular uprisings as have been witnessed in the “fourth wave of democracy” that swept across the Middle East. Filetti ends his piece by pointing out that another possible negative effect on democratization in Azerbaijan is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – pointing out, though, that resolution of territorial disputes is not necessarily a precondition to democratic breakthrough when other countries are studied.

Dr. Gulshan Pashayeva, Deputy Director of the Baku-based Center for Strategic Studies (SAM), assesses the impact of Track Two Initiatives on the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process. Providing an overview of the mediation efforts and track two initiatives concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, she explores the “sometimes uneasy” relationship between track one and track two diplomacy efforts. Some goals such as improving communication channels, promoting a culture of peace, and building trust and reconciliation can be best achieved through Track Two activities, she explains.

Geopolitical fault line shifts and security challenges in Turkey’s hydrocarbon-rich neighborhood have also brought energy security further into the spotlight. While TPQ dedicates its Summer issue primarily to energy-related debates, the subject is also taken up in this issue as an integral part of the region’s geostrategic scene.

On 31 October 2012, Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ), in conjunction with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF) and with the sponsorship of BP Turkey, hosted a roundtable discussion titled “The New Game of Energy in Turkey and its Neighborhood.” This event focused largely on the Southern Corridor, discussing developments regarding the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the prospects of northern Iraqi resources reaching Europe through Turkey. Regional geopolitical developments were woven into the debate, as the crisis in Syria, relations with Russia, the “Kurdish Problem” and other such issues directly relate to the regional energy power play. We have included an analysis of the discussions that took place in this issue of TPQ.

We are honored and delighted to present an interview with Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Taner Yıldız. Providing a general understanding of Turkey’s energy policy, Minister Yıldız comments on not only the expected pipeline-related developments, such as TANAP and the Arab Gas Pipeline, but also the government plans regarding power plants, coal reserves, renewable energy, and nuclear energy. The Minister proclaims that the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant will begin in the year 2014, and decisions about a second nuclear plant will be made by the end of this year.

In this issue of TPQ, NATO's role in energy infrastructure protection is taken up in a joint article by Michael Rühle and Julijus Grubliauskas, Head of the Energy Security Section in NATO's Emerging Security Challenges Division and analyst in the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division of NATO, respectively. The authors review how energy security has become firmly embedded in NATO's agenda, particularly since the new "Strategic Concept" was launched. Rühle and Grubliauskas acknowledge that there have been challenges in defining the nature of NATO's role in energy security, no less because interests of individual Allies differ considerably.

Rühle and Grubliauskas also clarify the energy-related dimension of why NATO cannot remain confined to specific borders in its task to protect its members. NATO member states rely on energy imports from regions outside NATO, and they explain that a terrorist attack on energy infrastructure facilities in these regions can reduce the Alliance's access to energy resources. They also illuminate the links between energy infrastructure security and emerging challenges, such as terrorism and cyber threats.

One of the reasons energy security is so high on the agenda is the growing energy demand from rising powers such as China and India. Moreover, the discovery of oil and gas around the islands contested between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and China has complicated these relations. Though TPQ primarily focuses on dynamics related to Turkey's neighborhood, in a globalizing world, given the shift of gravity to the East, Asia Pacific will also on occasion enter our scope.

In his article for TPQ, Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan, Head of the International Relations Department of the National Defence University in Islamabad, examines the patterns of competition between China and the U.S. in Southeast Asia, particularly focusing on the ASEAN. Khan argues that Southeast Asia's broader regional security depends on "harnessing and balancing Chinese and American power." The author points out the recent re-engagement of the U.S. with ASEAN, and views this as a response to the rise of China. The fact that President Obama chose to visit Southeast Asia as his first trip abroad after his re-election indeed highlights the importance of this region for Washington.

Finally, in this issue of TPQ, we have an article to remind us that the future may bring realignments currently unimaginable, just as much unexpected change has taken place in recent years. Marios Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos, CEO and Founder of the Thessaloniki-based Strategy International, speculates –or imagines– the possibility of a strategic alliance between Greece, Turkey, and Israel. He argues that

such a “triad” strategic relationship would serve the interests of the three countries as well as the international community of democracies, enabling the challenges in the Mediterranean and the Middle East to be tackled effectively.

TPQ content is much enriched by the opportunities for networking and the knowledge exchange provided by participation in debates taking place around the world. For this issue of TPQ, we would particularly like to thank the “food for thought” provided by the Hollings Center, EDAM, ECFR, and the Halifax International Security Forum.

The Hollings Center’s office in Istanbul organized a conference in July of 2012 titled “Foreign Policy and Competing Mediation in the Middle East and Central Asia.” The rise of emerging powers, their aspirations, and whether they provide “alternative” values and governance models were among the central themes taken up at this event. The rivalry between these emerging powers and Western players to infiltrate and influence regions such as the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as rising nationalism in the “emerging regions” was discussed. The changing role of Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and the relevance of the Turkey “model” were examined.

The participants of the dialogue organized by Hollings Center, many from the neighboring regions, noted that Turkey will need a sharp learning curve in order to develop sufficient knowledge of domestic dynamics across the region and build the credibility, personal relationships, language, and other levers of influence needed to play a guiding role in either the Middle East or Central Asia. Some considered Egypt’s potential to “diminish” the possibility for Turkey to play the regional leadership role it aspires to.

Some of the other questions raised were: Is Qatar a real emerging power, or a “fake” one? What ideology or which actor(s) will fill the void in Afghanistan when foreign troops withdraw? What are the prospects of an Islamist agenda taking hold in Central Asian politics? Might uprisings spread to Central Asia?

Observers of the region who took part in the Hollings Center event in Istanbul noted that in Central Asia, Russia has “the sharpest teeth” while China has marked success in forging a seemingly benevolent spirit of cooperation. Turkey, on the other hand, was said to have a relatively mixed track record, with ambitious rhetoric but unpredictable action – sometimes more appealing than the rest, yet disappointing at other times. Turkey’s experimenting with democracy promotion rhetoric and introducing aid as a foreign policy instrument was another dimension that was taken up in the debate.

The 8th Bodrum Roundtable, organized by the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) in October 2012, brought together leading names from the EU, Turkey, and the Arab world to discuss the challenges posed by the EU economic crisis, Turkey's accession prospects, and how Turkey and the EU can together balance principles, interests, and instruments to support transition in the Arab world.

At this event, some confidently said that the EU will get out of the crisis and preparation for "the day after" should already begin. Others, however, were skeptical about the inevitability of EU recovery and upsurge. The view that the EU needs a new "big idea" to mobilize the young generation and rejuvenate appeal among the countries on its periphery was articulated. The suggested way forward for the EU was to develop a vision to defend European values and interests in the global village on one hand, and to foster more regional autonomy within the Union on the other. It was pointed out that if the EU does not remain united and strong, the world could evolve into a bipolar order dominated by the U.S. and China.

It was also noted by participants that Turkey's path to regional leadership in its Muslim neighborhood had proven to be more turbulent than Ankara may have expected. Turkey needs the EU anchor ever more in light of its regional aspirations and for the sake of its own democratization. However, the maintenance of this anchor without a viable accession prospect may not be sustainable. Discussions suggested that Turkey's place in Europe was closely linked to the question of what kind of a Europe would eventually transpire. It was argued that if Turkey opted out of structural and agricultural funds as well as the free circulation of labor, there could be less resistance to Turkey obtaining seats in EU decision-making bodies.

Coming from the EU, Turkey, and the Arab world, the participants of the EDAM discussion were well suited to contrast the ability of European players to forge transition in Eastern Europe two decades ago versus to Middle Eastern countries today. They also took up angles such as the evolution of the European Endowment for Democracy and the lessons learned from structures of integration utilized in the Black Sea region – such as the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Participants from the region particularly noted the importance of channeling aid to the NGOs with genuine human rights agendas. Options to further economic development – investments, grants and trade liberalization – were also examined.

On 8-10 November, the European Council on Foreign Relations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo hosted a conference titled "The Future of Transatlantic Relations: South East Europe and Beyond" in Prishtina. Diverse speakers at the event emphasized the importance of the EU and the U.S. acting

together for achievements to be marked in the region. Another central pillar of the debates was the state of the EU and the prospects of the Europeanization of the Western Balkans. Many of the points raised about the European project's loss of appeal and the importance of enlivening EU conditionality also ring true for Turkey, and are relevant for Eastern Partnership neighbors of the EU as well.

The annual Halifax International Security Forum, which has been termed “the Davos of international security” by the Atlantic Monthly, took place this year on November 16-18 in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Hosted by Canada's Defense Minister Peter MacKay, who contributed his views to TPQ last year, the event brought together some of the world's leading experts and policymakers for thought-provoking conversations for the fourth time. With *Foreign Affairs* as the media partner, “soul-searching” questions such as the following were tackled:

Does the U.S. need to be centrally involved in crises in which it does not have vital interests, and what will happen to chaos situations if the U.S. “leads from behind”? What are the similarities between Bosnia and Syria in terms of grounds for, and interest in, Western intervention? Does the U.S. do more harm than good by intervention, or does the community of democratic countries have the “responsibility” to intervene under certain circumstances? Will innovation-driven growth necessarily lead to the demand of freedoms or can a “model” that does not involve liberal democratic values be sustainable among the emerging powers? How can the EU foster stability and prosperity in its neighborhood without an enlargement agenda? Are sanctions building to popular pressure against the regime in the case of Iran, or was the only window of opportunity to sway the Islamic Republic missed by inaction during the demonstrations in Tehran in 2009?

The Halifax platform also assessed topical developments, such as the marginalization of secularists and women after the Arab revolutions, the effective formation of an axis including China, Russia, Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, the concerns about jihadist opposition gaining strength in Syria and the prospects of ever “reassembling” the country.

Senator McCain in particular underlined that the Russian veto in the UN Security Council (UNSC) is not sufficient reason for not acting more forcefully to end the “slaughter” taking place in Syria, and expressed his opinion that inaction would go down as “a shameful chapter in U.S. history.”

As TPQ we have been delighted to serve as a media partner for the prestigious Atlantic Council Energy & Economic Summit 2012 that took place in Istanbul in November 2012. TPQ was also present as a media partner at the Financial Times

Turkey Summit in the same month. We also have exciting media partnerships to look forward to in the near future, such as the 4th International Thessaloniki Summit organized by Strategy International to take place in March 2013.

Another event that we would like to take the opportunity to highlight is the conference TPQ organized jointly with the Baku-based Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) and Caucasus International (CI) in Summer 2012. On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of independence in the South Caucasus, the conference, entitled “Forging the future of the Caucasus: The past 20 years and its lessons,” brought prominent experts together in Baku, including two of TPQ’s advisory board members: Professor Gerard Libaridian and Professor Alexander Rondeli. We appreciate the opportunity provided by SAM and CI for a frank debate on crucial regional matters. The report of the conference is available on the TPQ website www.turkishpolicy.com

We are very pleased to announce that Matthew J. Bryza has agreed to join our Advisory Board. Mr. Bryza is currently Director of the International Center for Defence Studies in Tallinn, Estonia, and a non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States. Previously he served for 23 years as a U.S. diplomat, a period over which he rose to the center of policy-making and international negotiations on major energy infrastructure projects and regional conflicts in Eurasia. His most recent assignment was as U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan from February 2011 to January 2012.

This is the fifth issue of TPQ since 2002 that has been supported by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. We also took part in activities drawing attention to the 60th anniversary of Turkey’s NATO membership last year. We are proud of this lasting relationship which enables us to contribute to the sharing of diverse perspectives about the future of the Alliance, and Turkey’s place in it.

We would like to extend a special thanks to the main corporate sponsor of this Fall 2012 issue, Yapı Kredi. We are happy to welcome Fibabank among our sponsors, and appreciate the continuing support of Turcas Petrol, Garanti Bank, İş Bank, BP Turkey, Akbank, TAV, and Finansbank. We remain grateful to Kadir Has University for its generous contributions. As always, we welcome feedback from our readers, and appreciate your choice to follow Turkey and its neighborhood through TPQ.

Diba Nigâr Göksel