Internationalism vs. Parochialism in the era of Globalization: Can the EU help the search for security in the Middle East?

The purpose of this paper is to describe internationalism and parochialism and link the impact of both using the examples provided by the European Union and the Middle East in a comparative manner. Then the role of public opinion with regard to these two approaches will be examined. The paper will conclude by arguing that examples from other regions of the world suggest that states in the Middle East are more likely to develop a secure environment for themselves if they could encourage a ‘democratic culture’ in domestic politics to emerge. In the short run there is, of course, the risk that a parochial public opinion encouraged by populism will become vociferous but this can be controlled by active involvement of the EU in supporting democratic transition. The benefits of globalization in terms of greater democracy, rule of law and economic prosperity will be a powerful motivating factor for such a public opinion or constituencies to emerge.

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Introduction:

Today an important source of insecurity continues to be territorial disputes between countries. However, in an increasingly globalized world this is not the only source of insecurity. Issues ranging from illegal migration, corruption, organized crime and more traditional national security threats such as weapons of mass destruction and excessive armaments are additional sources of state insecurity too. As states, in our global village, search for ways to enhance their security, two approaches appear to compete with each other with respect to how to address security issues. Internationalism advocates cooperation as a means of resolving inter-state conflicts as well as security challenges associated with globalization. However, internationalism also goes hand in hand with the development of a ‘democratic culture’ within countries. It is this ‘democratic culture’ that enables the notion of ‘democratic peace’ in international relations to emerge. The alternative is parochialism, a policy approach which is the product of deep mistrust of other states and international actors. Parochialism is also closely associated with weakness or lack of a ‘democratic culture’ in domestic politics. None of these approaches exist in their pure and absolute form. In fact, they often compete with each other. However, competition and the ensuing debate unquestionably requires that there be some minimum degree of ‘democratic culture’. Public opinion plays a critical role with respect to which approach prevails at any point in time. Policies often are outcomes of influence exerted by advocates of both approaches.

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Internationalism vs. Parochialism

Since the end of the Cold War the world has become a much more complex environment in terms of how security is maintained. Security has acquired a much broader meaning. The traditional means of ensuring national security, in the form of enhancement of national defense capabilities and collective defense arrangements have become inadequate. Globalization has undermined the ability of states to control their own territory in respect to movement of people, goods and capital. Globalization has increased the economic gap between the ‘haves’ and have-nots’. This in turn has played an important role in, for example, the expansion of terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration, all of which represent new challenges to nation-states. Particularly, the reaction to 9/11 has caused the US to advocate the use of force against the challenge of terrorism. Israel too has taken a similar approach as well as Russia in the case of the Chechens. Yet, at the same time globalization has also put a premium on international cooperation to address national and transnational problems. It has encouraged regional integration both of an economic and political nature, to enhance paradoxically the ability of nation-states to meet some of the
security challenges brought on by globalization. These developments have also been accompanied by a need to encourage greater democracy, accountability, transparency and multi-culturalism. The latter developments have been critical in addressing the security risks emanating from ethnic nationalism, corruption and human rights violations. A case in point in terms of resolving the threat of terrorism to national security might be the most recent agreement signed between the Sri Lankan governments and Tamils in Thailand in September 2002.

Hence, it is possible to argue that globalization has both been a source of new security challenges for nation-states and a source of inspiration for solutions to these challenges. The approach that emphasizes cooperation and trust in the ‘other’ sees international relations as an arena where if nation-states cooperate with each other they all can benefit from it even if the gains of each may be relative. However, the point is that each society one way or another benefits from participating in international cooperation then if they stayed out of it. This approach can be called internationalism. Internationalism in the domestic arena is also characterized by efforts or reforms to bring about greater democratization, pluralism and governmental accountability. This aspect of globalization has helped to spread democratic culture to areas of the world that only two decades ago lacked it. The most striking example of this is Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Undoubtedly, the role of the European Union in exporting democracy while at the same time engendering the right environment for it has been critical. This in turn is helping to develop a culture in which democracy can flourish both in domestic politics and in international relations. This cultural paradigm shift increases the likelihood that countries will be able to resolve their domestic problems internally as well as problems with their neighbors peacefully through negotiations rather than with the threat or use of force. A culture in which values consistent with democracy become accepted norms are the *sine quo non* of ‘democratic peace’. \(^1\)

It is also possible to identify aspects of globalization that exacerbate national insecurities and economic inequalities, as well as provoking radical nationalism, parochialism, religiosity and xenophobia. It is especially people among those sections of a society most adversely affected by the negative aspects of globalization that become vulnerable. These developments fuel national distrust in the international community and the ‘other’. Governments and decision makers under pressure from anti-globalists and anti-immigration groups on the one hand and terrorism and ethno-nationalism on the other have been tempted to adopt policies that threaten to undermine the very values of pluralist democracy and the rule of law. Populist politicians and statesmen attribute such problems associated with globalization to the international community if not to conspiracies to undermine national independence and identity. This has been accompanied by calls for greater national unity and unilateral adoption of national measures rather than measures developed through international cooperation. The international environment is viewed as an anarchic arena where typically nation-states play zero-sum games. The expectation is that nation-states have to stand up for their own and that inevitably if one nation-state wins the other must lose. Such an approach to international security inevitably leads to a destabilization of the international community by creating distrust and thereby becoming self-fulfilling prophecies. This reaction to globalization can be called parochialism.

\(^1\) For an elaboration of the idea of ‘democratic peace’ and its application to the Middle East see an earlier paper presented to this group by the author of this paper, “Hobbes, Locke, Kant and the Security Malaise in the Middle East” paper prepared for presentation at the conference on “Mideast Regional Security in a Transitional Era” Istanbul, Turkey from 6th-9th January 2002
It is difficult not to identify a country or groups of countries that have not been affected by both internationalism and parochialism one way or the other. Member countries of the European Union represent a group of countries that have been particularly successful in responding to globalization in general. Internationalism has manifested itself in a high degree of regional integration and a pooling of sovereignties that has significantly improved the living standards of the people living in the European Union. The EU is also trying to respond to both traditional as well as new and broader security challenges through regional cooperation. The level of integration in this area, however, has remained much more limited. National interest considerations accompanied with parochialism plays an important role in this. Over the last few years with the increase in illegal migration and organized crime, but particularly since 9/11, there is a growing threat perception to national identities in the EU too.

At a time when the ‘Convention on the future of Europe’ is debating ways of enhancing democratic values, multiculturalism and the idea of a ‘Europe of values’ rather than a Christian and geographically defined Europe, parts of the European public appears to be moving toward a more conservative position in terms of immigrants and the idea of a multicultural Europe. In these circles mistrust for the ‘other’, in this case the Muslim world at large has grown. The temptation to betray the values associated with internationalism grows. This was most strikingly demonstrated in the case of the first round of the presidential elections in France when populist and xenophobic leader Jean-Marie Le Pen defeated his socialist opponent to become the second candidate to contest the final round against the current president of France, Jacques Chirac. Although, the French public at large defeated Le Pen in the second round of the elections, under pressure from sections of the European society a degree of parochialism seems to be influencing governmental policies in the EU. This development risks endangering and even setting back gains achieved in the EU with regard to, for example, the rule of law, a sacrosanct characteristic of a ‘Europe of values’. One example in point is the manner in which governments in Europe, under pressure from a parochial public opinion, contemplate to combat illegal migration. The contemplated policies included for example the interdiction of suspected ships carrying illegal immigrants on the high seas, forcing their return to their point of departure. Such a policy risks violating international law governing the freedom of navigation in international waters. Furthermore, such a policy also risks violating both the European acquis on asylum as well as international refugee law if among the illegal immigrants being forcefully returned to their point of departure there were to be asylum seekers. Hence, under pressure from an adversely affected public opinion, EU governments appear to be contemplating the possibility of confronting some of the new security challenges generated by globalization in a manner that may strain the positive qualities of the European Union. The contest between internationalism and parochialism exist even in the EU and appears to be an unending contest. Nevertheless, the EU governments and at least the majority of the public appears to continue to uphold the values of ‘internationalism’.

The situation in the Middle East is even more complicated. On the one hand the positive effects of globalization, in the form of demands for greater democracy and accountable government, is increasingly being felt by Middle Eastern countries. On the other hand the Middle East remains bogged down in territorial conflicts, terrorism, political repression, absence of economic development, corruption and organized crime. These problems have been most eloquently raised by the Arab Human Development Report 2002.\footnote{The report can be reached at http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/bychapter.html} The Israeli-
Palestinian conflict continues to linger on as both sides have become deeply alienated from each other and advance maximalist demands from the opposition. The relatively cooperative framework of interaction between the two sides that had characterized the 1990s has been replaced by an environment of utter confrontation and parochialism. Relations between Israel and other Arab countries have deteriorated too. During the 1990s some Arab governments had chosen to develop some degree of cooperative relations with Israel while some had preferred to pursue a ‘cold’ peace. This situation has given way to a cold war. The violence and terrorism that has engulfed the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel has also fueled the forces of parochialism in the Middle East. The situation in Iraq and the US administration’s determination to bring about a regime change in Iraq is creating further tension and insecurity.

The Middle East appears to be locked into a situation reminiscent of the 1960s and 1970s. The period had been characterized by an utter absence of democracy and accountable government. This is in some contrast with the 1990s when a degree of ‘internationalism’ appeared to be making some in-roads in the Middle East. The cooperative aspect of it has already been mentioned. The most striking evidence of this mood was reflected in some of the good work achieved in the context of the Madrid process and the Multilaterals, not to mention the gains made in the context of Israeli-Palestinians relations and the MENA summits. At the domestic level some degree of democratization seemed to be occurring as reasonably competitive local and national levels began to take place in some Arab countries such Palestine, Jordan and some Gulf countries. Civil society in the pluralist sense of the word seemed to be emerging too. May be the most striking among these developments was the expectation that with the passing away of Hafiz Al-Assad in Syria his son would usher in a period of reform. Over the last two years all these developments appear to have fizzled away. Instead, the region finds itself again conflict-ridden with little room for ‘democratic culture’. Worse still is that, this is occurring at a time when certain regions of the world that were once characterized by tension and insecurity are managing to resolve or manage conflicts driven by forces of parochialism. In the Balkans, in parts of Europe, in Asia and even on the peripheries of the Middle East countries are slowly but surely managing to adopt policies guided by internationalism.

The Role of Public Opinion:

Public opinion plays a critical role in the definition of security challenges and the formulation of policies to meet these challenges. During the Cold War, public opinion in Western Europe, with the exception of some fringe groups, defined the Soviet Union and communism as a major security threat. This facilitated the mobilization of support for high national defense expenditures. The end of the Cold War brought with it the expectation of a fall in these expenditures and a corresponding increase in public economic welfare. During the course of the 1990s most EU member countries found themselves reducing their defense budgets. It is precisely a public reluctant to see an increase in defense expenditures that constitutes an important factor slowing the development of ESDP. Some policy analysts had great difficulties convincing the public that weapons of mass destruction were a real threat. The public perceived this threat as a remote and distant threat. However, the September 11 attacks have changed this drastically in the case of the United States, even if much less in the case of European public opinion.

One important consequence of the September 11 attacks is not only the way in which the American public has been receptive to significant increases in national security expenditures
but also how receptive they have been to the introduction of public safety measures that in the past would most likely have been challenged on the grounds that they would have an adverse effect on liberal democracy, multiculturalism and the rule of law. In the case of Europe too it is possible to see the emergence of a public opinion that is much less tolerant or supportive of the same values associated with liberal democracy. The European public’s reaction to the September 11 attacks appear to be filtered through a growing reaction to immigrants, refugees and Muslims. In Europe it is not so much that there is a growing support for an increase in defense expenditures. Instead some Europeans are putting growing emphasis on protecting national and cultural identity. In a number of leading European countries recent elections have been marked by a rise in support for the extreme right. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair’s reaction to the capture of large numbers of illegal immigrants in Britain in May and his call that force might be used against ships carrying illegal immigrants need to be seen from this perspective. Illegal immigrants are not only seen as a threat to national identity and culture in European countries but they are also seen as a potential threat, paradoxically, to a European identity stressing multiculturalism and liberal democracy. It is possible that Tony Blair was reacting more in an attempt to prevent British public opinion from slipping to the right rather illegal migration per se.

These developments demonstrate how threat perceptions are shaped by public opinion and in turn public opinion influences the formulation of policy to confront security challenges. Decision makers, be they politicians, diplomats or bureaucrats, inevitably have to be responsive to public opinion if their policies are going to be transparent and legitimate. Public opinion will tell them what is acceptable and what is not in terms of both threat perceptions as well as policy. Furthermore, public opinion is also critical in terms of inter-governmental negotiations. Negotiators have to be aware of what is acceptable to their own constituencies when negotiating with their counterparts but also will need to know the limits of maneuverability that their counterpart may enjoy. In that sense public opinion plays a critical role in reaching international consensus over threat perceptions as well as their resolution. However, public opinion is not static either. Politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, activists, the media etc… can all impact and influence how the public perceives certain issues. Hence, what such people say about threat perceptions and what policies they articulate and advocate will be critical. Also the position taken by leading interest groups and non-governmental groups will be critical in shaping public opinion. They will have a bearing on the general public opinion in terms of their perceptions of security threats and policy recommendations. Furthermore, developments in one country invariably can have an impact on the public opinion of another country. This is particularly the case in the European Union and its immediate vicinity. Undoubtedly, instant communication, an important element of globalization, plays an important role in this. Therefore, how the public opinion of a country defines a security problem and how its decision makers address these issues directly influence how public opinion will continue to develop.

This relationship and the policy implication are best captured by the notion of the two level diplomatic games of Putnam. Putnam argues that when decision makers are negotiating with each other, they inevitably keep an eye on their own as well as on each other’s public opinion. They also use public opinion as a bargaining card. It is possible to argue that the manner in which decision makers relate to their public opinion as well as the public opinion of other countries can have an impact on formation of threat perceptions. Hence, decision

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makers can adopt policies and/or discourses that can aggravate threat perceptions on the one hand or quell them both in their own countries as well as in other countries. In other words, decision makers are both helping influence and shape public opinion as well as being influenced by it. If international relations can be thought of as on going iterations of interactions, the manner in which decision makers interact with each other will play a critical role in whether at any point in time internationalism or parochialism prevails in addressing security challenges emanating from globalization. Decision makers can, other factors remaining constant, invoke parochialism while at the same time they can play a role in encouraging internationalism.

In the Middle East, the independent role of public opinion has been limited. Two factors appear to determine the role and place of public opinion, especially in Arab countries. Often politicians have shaped public opinion in favor of their preferences. Firstly, absence of a culture which fosters the growth of democratic norms has prevented legitimate alternative views and opinions to develop. For public opinion to be able to express itself, there needs to exist, at a minimum, a reasonably free media and a political culture that allows for free expression of views and opinions without fear of repression. Secondly, an important proportion of the Arab public opinion lacks critical qualities. Decades of government propaganda and populist policies directed towards shaping Arab public opinion has created an environment that is not particularly conducive to critical thinking. Such populist policies have been typically embedded with parochial messages to perpetuate enmity with other countries and to serve to unify ranks behind a ‘national security state’. This in turn has muffled alternative voices that might otherwise advocate ‘internationalism’ and forced them to remain silent for fear of being branded as traitors. Thirdly, Israeli policies of a parochial nature, such as the ones led by right wing governments perpetuating occupation of Palestinian territory, i.e. encouraging the construction of settlements, mass punishments of civilians etc… have fueled parochial Arab and Palestinian public opinion perpetuating the vicious circle of mistrust and confrontation between Arab countries and Israel.

During the 1990s when the peace process was still in place and there was, to some degree, a political liberal climate in the Arab world, it was possible to hear alternative voices in the public arena. There were many examples of cooperative projects supported by a variety of constituencies among Palestinians, Arabs and Israelis. Such constituencies are critical in terms of developing and consolidating ‘internationalism’. However, what is also critical is the position that political leadership takes. Political leaders need to demonstrate a leadership style that supports ‘internationalism’. This is not at all an easy exercise and in terms of political leaders is filled with major risks. There are ample examples, both in history as well as in recent times, demonstrating where such leadership has emerged in the Middle East as well as elsewhere. The case of Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat in the aftermath of the adoption of the Oslo Accords is such an example. The efforts of the Sri Lankan government leadership and the Tamil leadership in resolving their conflict is another example whose timing coincides well with the date of this meeting here in Athens. The achievements of Eleftherios Venizelos from Greece and Kemal Atatürk from Turkey in the 1930s, both of whom worked together to pave the way for the reconciliation of the two nations, which had just fought a long and bitter war is an appropriate example from the history of this region. Similar observations can be made about French and German leaders such as Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer, both of whom played critical roles in the reconciliation of France and Germany, thereby planting the seeds of today’s European Union.
What to do? Is there a role for the EU as an agency of ‘internationalism’?

Many different suggestions can be advocated to improve the chances of ‘internationalism’ against ‘parochialism’ in the Middle East. In this paper emphasis will be put on the *sine quo non* nature of introducing and nurturing a ‘democratic culture’ in order to achieve regional security through ‘internationalism’. This paper will also argue that the international community and in particular the EU has a critical role to play as an organization capable of ‘exporting’ security and assisting the development of a regional ‘security community’. The two inevitably go hand in hand and are also closely linked to efforts to resolve the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

The Arab Middle East has long been characterized by totalitarian regimes. Yet, there have also been regimes in the past that have, at different points in time, shown the will to bring about degrees of political liberalization. This has already been mentioned. However, the situation today is significantly different than in the past. Until the end of the Cold War countries were able to choose between democratic regimes and authoritarian-totalitarian regimes. The Arab world by and large had made in the 1950s its choice in favor of the latter. Globalization today has set democracy and in particular pluralist democracy as the only standard. There is mounting pressure on societies to move in the direction of greater democracy and the international community and in particular the European Union has acquired an important role in encouraging democratic transformation. However, there is a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma here. For the international community to play a positive role there also has to be a leadership willing and able to express a preference for adopting democracy and supporting the development of ‘democratic culture’. It is only then that the international community and in certain cases the EU can move and assist the process of transformation. However, the international community can not remain utterly passive either. It has to embark on a role that can set incentives for democratization.

The case of Turkey and Turkey’s search for security might be useful example to briefly investigate. Turkey has been struggling to bring the level of its democracy to that of Europe since 1950. It has been a very long process that is still far from being completed. However, the incentives provided by the international community in the form of prospects of membership in the western political-military alliance against the Soviet threat was an important factor that encouraged the one party leadership of the time to give the green light for free and fair elections. This opened the way for a dramatic regime change in 1950 that ushered Turkey into a process of transformation from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. Since then there have been a number of interruptions and only recently have new reforms been introduced that will, hopefully, significantly improve the quality of democracy in Turkey. On this occasion too, the international community, in this particular case the European Union has played an important role in this transformation.

The leadership and the long-standing public desire to become part of the EU gave the EU considerable leverage over Turkey’s transformation. However, what is also critical is that in 1999 the EU decided to actually engage Turkey in this transformation by opening the road for full membership if Turkey was to improve its democracy. This is having a significant impact on balance between proponents of ‘internationalism’ versus ‘parochialism’ in Turkey. The transformation that Turkey has being going through over the last few years has created a public opinion that is increasingly diverse and able to express different opinion on previously

highly guarded and sensitive ‘national security’ issues. These range from the conflicts with Greece, to the problem of Cyprus, membership in the EU, relations with Israel, the Kurdish problem inside the country, etc. Civil society has become much richer and a larger number of constituencies compete with each for influence over government decisions. However, this is being done with a growing understanding that conflicts have to be resolved through negotiations and a process of give and take. This is strengthening the hand of ‘internationalism’ against ‘parochialism’. It is becoming much more difficult for politicians and officials to have parochial and populist ideas accepted by the public without any questioning.

In the debate over Turkey’s membership of the EU, there are politicians, columnists, even generals who have argued that the EU is a Christian club that would never admit a Muslim country in its ranks even if it is a secular state. This idea has met considerable challenge and a former president of Turkey even ridiculed the idea expressed by a general. A public opinion survey also indicated that almost half of the respondents believed that there was room for Muslim membership in the EU. Another case in point occurred during the Israeli besieging of Yaser Arafat’s headquarter in Ramallah in February 2002. A group of Islamist activists turned up to protest the Israeli actions during a soccer game played by a leading national team Fenerbahçe. They were calling on an Israeli player of this team to ‘go home’. There was much protest of this action in various quarters, saying that no one person should be held responsible of the Israeli government. After the 1999 earthquake, the Turkish Minister of Health, in a typically parochial and populist fashion, refused to accept international humanitarian assistance especially from Greece and Armenia and was extensively criticized and finally had to publicly back down from his earlier statements. It is difficult to imagine how these developments could have occured in Turkey, if it were not for the existence of a relatively democratic environment.

Similar observations can be made in terms of Turkey’s international relations too. There is much greater debate in Turkey regarding what approach to adopt towards Greek-Turkish relations and the resolution of the problem of Cyprus. Public opinion expresses a greater variety of views and traditional populist-parochial discourse no longer receives unquestioning support. There are also a large number of civil society and interest groups advocating views much are more closely associated with ‘internationalism’. In fact, Greece has also witnessed major transformations in this respect since the populist and parochial PASOK leadership of Andreas Papandreou was replaced by the much more ‘internationalist’ Costas Simitis. The extent of the transformation has been so drastic that George Papandreou has been able to visit the western Thrace region of Greece and acknowledge that among the Muslims that live in the region there are also Turks. In the days of his father’s reign this would have been considered political suicide. In those days the public use of the term ‘Turk’ was actually banned. These developments clearly played an important role in strengthening and encouraging ‘internationalist’ views to emerge and express themselves in Turkey, and in that sense have been an excellent example of how ‘democratic culture’ actually helps the expansion of ‘democratic peace’.

It would be very difficult to explain these developments without acknowledging the role of the EU. The EU has been playing a critical role in transforming the political systems of countries as well as a country’s approach to security. A good example of what the EU is capable of achieving in respect to transforming a country’s dominant culture of politics and

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5 The results of this survey can be obtained from www.tesev.org.tr.
international relations is the case of Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. Bulgaria is a candidate state that is experiencing tremendous domestic transformation. It was only about a decade ago that the Turkish and Pomak minorities in Bulgaria were being forced out of the country en masse. The deep sense of insecurity and mistrust that had brought the two countries to the brink of war has now been replaced by one of extensive cooperation. Today, members of the Turkish minority are actually represented in the government formed after the elections held in Bulgaria in June 2001. It might be too early to argue that relations between the two countries are governed by a purely ‘internationalist’ approach but the movement appears to be in that direction. At least the parochial influence over these relations has dissipated to such an extent that both sides have, for all intents and purposes demilitarized the frontier areas between the two countries. Furthermore, in a symbolically dramatic decision, Bulgaria allowed Turkish troops to cross its territory to join NATO peace keeping operations in Kosovo. This was the first time since the Balkan wars in 1912-1913 that the Turkish military had entered the region. Considering that until very recently ‘Turks’ and the ‘Ottomans’ were the central ‘other’ figure in populist parochial discourse in the Balkans, the significance of the decision can be better appreciated.

It is only after long years of EU membership that Greek democracy has become pluralistic and confident enough to challenge Turkey to enter a relationship going beyond the one dominated by a populist outlook. The same could be said about the role Greece played in the Balkans during the course of the 1990s. There is a drastic difference between its attitude in the first half of the decade compared to its approach in the second half. In the case of Turkey, the prospects of EU membership and what membership may bring is generating tremendous pressures for reform. This is already having an impact on Turkey’s foreign policy. If Turkey’s membership process progresses well, it is inevitable that the influence of parochial culture in Turkish foreign policy will gradually be replaced by an ‘internationalist’ one.

These are examples demonstrating the influence of the EU in expanding the domain of ‘internationalism’. The most important tool here has been, in the case of Greece, EU membership and in the case of Bulgaria and Turkey the prospects of membership. Clearly, this is not a tool that is available to the EU in the case of the Middle East. Nevertheless, the EU should focus greater energy into developing a strategy for the Middle East as it is doing for Russia, the Balkans and the Caucasus. The EU has recently become more involved in efforts to resolve the crisis between the Palestinians and Israel. However, the effort needs to go beyond just emergency and crisis escalation prevention efforts. Clearly, the Barcelona process falls short of providing the right incentives to precipitate regime transformation. This strategy will need to be formulated in a manner that can encourage growth of a civil society capable of expressing alternative views in respect to problem resolution. As the UNDP report suggests, there is a growing awareness in the Arab world of the benefits of globalization and the need for transformation. In this context, economic development is a critical area in light of the depressed nature of Arab economies and the growing pressures of finding employment for a young population that is prey to fundamentalist Islamic influence.

Another important role that the EU and the international community can play is to dampen the negative influence that early stages of democratic transition can have on ‘internationalism’ and the prospects of ‘democratic peace’. The literature in this area suggests that countries in the early stages of democracy and democratic transition run higher risks of

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6 For a contribution to the debate on this subject see reports prepared by the Centre for European Policy Studies, M. Emerson, The Elephant and the Bear: The European Union, Russia and their Near Abroads (CEPS, Brussels, 2001); A Stability Pact for the Caucasus (2000);
getting involved in international conflicts and crises. The case of Greece and Turkey back in the 1950s and 1960s is offered as an example of how early stages of democratization make politicians and officials prey to populist pressures and increase the likelihood of adopting confrontationist policies. However, it is possible that in the post-Cold War era this is less likely to occur, especially where the EU is involved. For example, many of the candidate states from Eastern Europe had fledging democracies; however, their relationship with the EU helped to address their conflicts with their neighbors without resorting to parochialism.

Conclusion:

The most important problem needing a solution is still in Middle East. The Middle East elite have to muster the will that will be necessary to finally opt for transforming their political system into one in which the prospects for the emergence of ‘democratic culture’ are increased. This is still the critical factor. It is only then that an involvement of the EU can materialize. As important as this factor may be, achieving a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be critical. Here clearly, there is a ‘Catch 22’ situation. A lasting breakthrough for the peaceful resolution of the conflict requires the replacement of ‘parochialism’ by ‘internationalism’. Yet, right now the conflict is fueling parochialism in the region and complicating the prospects of transition to democracy and the development of a ‘democratic culture’ needed to sustain a resolution of the conflict. The notion of replacing the current Palestinian leadership by force appears to be anathema to ‘internationalism’ and to the search of regional security. It is also highly doubtful whether the use of force will be able to breed the will needed to finally bring about democratic change in the region. It is also highly doubtful whether or not such a strategy will help alter public opinion and develop constituencies able to express support for ‘internationalism’. In the meantime, if ‘democratic culture’ is given a chance this will inevitably provide an opportunity for a pluralized public opinion to emerge. In such a public opinion, it will be possible to find constituencies that will be support ‘internationalism’ as heartily as they did ‘parochialism’. However, the critical point is that the international community and interest groups with a stake in peace and cooperation must have a chance to exert influence and enjoy a say in policy making.
